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JURISDICTION OF THE APPELLATE COURT
This is an appeal of an order granting summary judgment in favor of the
Appellees, Salt Lake City Knee & Sports Medicine, Lonnie E. Paulos, M.D., P.C., and
Thomas D. Rosenberg, M.D., P.C., and dismissing the Appellant, Salt Lake Knee &
Sports Rehabilitation, Inc.'s Complaint for Declaratory Relief. The action involves a
dispute between the parties as to their respective rights and status under the Termination
Agreement and Purchase Agreement entered into between them. The order was entered
by Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson in the Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt
Lake County, State of Utah. This Court has jurisdiction of this Appeal pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. §78-2a-3(2)(j) (1996). Originally, the Utah Supreme Court had jurisdiction
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-2-2(3)(j) (1996) as the Court of Appeals does not have
original appellate jurisdiction. However, pursuant to Notice dated June 1, 1998, the Utah
Supreme Court transferred this case to the Utah Court of Appeals for disposition.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON APPEAL
1. Did the trial court err as a matter of law in granting the Appellees' Motion for
Summary Judgment on the basis that the sale of Appellees' interest in the subject business

1
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did not include the sale of the name "Salt Lake Sports Medicine Center" sinjiply because
the name was not expressly listed in the documents as an asset sold?
2. Did the trial court err in granting summary judgment in the face c|>f genuine
issues of material fact?
Because this case was decided on summary judgment, the issues are issues of law.
Therefore, the trial court's determination is accorded no deference by the appellate court.
but it is reviewed for correctness. (Higgins v. Salt Lake County 855 P.2d 2. 1,235 (Utah
1993); Clover v. Snowbird Ski Resort 808 P.2d 1037, 1040 (Utah 1991).) Summary
judgment is precluded where issues of material fact remain unresolved. FinMly, in
reviewing a grant of summary judgment, an appellate court must view the facts and all
reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the noq-moving
party. (See Higgins 855 P.2d at 233, and Clover. 808 P.2d at 1039.)
DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITY
Rule 56(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
Motion and proceeding thereon. The motion shall be
served at least 10 days before the time fixed for the hearing.
The adverse party prior to the day of hearing may serve
opposing affidavits. The judgment sough shall be rendered
forthwith of the pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the
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1

affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law. A summary judgment,
interlocutory in character, may be rendered on the issue of
liability alone although there is genuine issue as to the amount
of damages.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The Appellant, Salt Lake Knee & Sports Rehabilitation, Inc., (hereinafter
"Rehabilitation" or "Appellant") filed its Complaint for Declaratory Relief on October 4,
1991 seeking a declaratory judgment that a transaction by and between the Appellees and
IHC Hospitals, Inc. (hereinafter referred to as "IHC") on or about May 24, 1990
constituted a "sale" as that term is defined in the Termination Agreement and Purchase
Agreement by and between the parties to this action (hereinafter referred to as the
"Termination Agreement"). Pursuant to the Termination Agreement, if the transaction
was in fact a "sale", Rehabilitation is entitled to payment from the Appellees in an amount
equal to one-third of the purchase price attributable to the purchase of goodwill. (R. 229.) Subsequently, the Appellees filed an Amended Answer and Counterclaim alleging
that Rehabilitation breached certain non-competition provisions of the Termination
Agreement. The Counterclaim was later dismissed with prejudice by stipulation of the

3
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parties. (R. 143-165.) The Order of Dismissal was entered by the court on February 16,
1994. (R. 411.)
The Appellees, Salt Lake Knee & Sports Medicine, Lonnie E. Pauloi, M.D., P.C.
and Thomas D. Rosenberg M.D., P.C. filed their first Motion for Summary Judgment on
or about June 15, 1993, alleging that Rehabilitation could not produce evidence sufficient
to avoid dismissal of its claims on summary judgment. (R. 168-170 and 171-196.)
Rehabilitation filed a Counter Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, arguing that the
transaction between the Appellees and IHC on or about May 24, 1990 was in fact a "sale"
as that term is defined in the Termination Agreement and that Rehabilitation was entitled
to judgment against the Appellees in an amount to be proven at trial representing one
third of the purchase price attributable to the purchase of good will. Rehabi itation
further moved the court for summary judgment dismissing the Appellees' Counterclaims
with prejudice. The court granted the Appellees' Motion for Summary Judgment; denied
the countermotion; and dismissed Rehabilitation's Complaint with prejudice. (R. 494-95.)
Rehabilitation filed its Notice of Appeal on or about April 11, 1994. (R. 417-18.)
The Court of Appeals reversed the Order of Summary Judgment and remanded the case to
the trial court to resolve what it determined was the sole remaining factual issue, that is,
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whether the joint venture continued to operate at the same location under the same name
after the May 24, 1990 transaction. (Salt Lake Knee & Sports Rehabilitation v. Salt Lake
Knee & Sports Medicine 909 P.2d 266, 270 (Utah App 1995)) After some additional
discovery, the Appellees filed a second Motion for Summary Judgment, which the court
subsequently granted on the basis that, since the May, 1990 purchase documents do not
expressly list the name of the business "Salt Lake Sports Medicine Center" as an asset
being sold, it was not sold.

Therefore, the requirements of the Termination Agreement

had not been satisfied, and Appellant is not entitled to the relief requested. The order was
entered on February 10, 1998; it was modified by Order Granting Plaintiffs Objection to
Defendants Order on Summary Judgment dated April 3, 1998; the notice of appeal was
filed on April 28, 1998; and the case was poured over from the Utah Supreme Court by
notice dated June 1, 1998.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1. Prior to May 22, 1989, the parties to this action were working together to
provide medical and physical therapy services at the Salt Lake Sports Medicine Center
located at 670 East 3900 South, Salt Lake City, Utah (hereinafter sometimes referred to as
the "Center") pursuant to the terms of a Professional Services Contract and Lease

5
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Agreement entered into by the parties in 1987 (hereinafter referred to as the
Services Contract".) (R. 202, 234 and 238.)
2. At all times pertinent hereto, the Appellees, Salt Lake City Knee |& Medicine
(hereinafter sometimes referred to as "Medicine") was a Utah general partnership and the
Defendants, Lonnie E. Paulos, M.D., P.C. and Thomas D. Rosenberg, M.D.J P.C., were
the general partners of Salt Lake Knee & Sports Medicine (hereinafter sometimes referred
to as "Paulos" and "Rosenberg".) (For brevity, when being referred to as a gipup, all
defendants will be referred to as "Appellees".) (R. 202.)
3. Prior to the termination of the Professional Services Contract, the parties to this
action became involved in negotiations with IHC Hospitals, Inc. (hereinafter referred to
as "IHC") for the purchase of the Center. Negotiations were also ongoing wjth HCA/St.
Marks. (R. 202,234 and 239.)
4. On or about January 19, 1989, Doug Toole, a principal of Rehabilitation,
informed Rosenberg and Paulos that he and Greg Gardner, another principal of
Rehabilitation, were not willing to terminate their business relationship with Holy Cross
Hospital in order to work exclusively with IHC. Paulos left the room and returned with a
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Notice of Termination dated January 19, 1989, terminating the Professional Services
Contract. (R. 203 and 239.)
5. On or about May 22, 1989, the parties entered into a Termination Agreement
and Purchase Agreement which outlined the agreement of the parties with respect to their
respective rights and obligations on termination, (hereinafter "Termination Agreement").
Attorneys for Appellees drafted the Termination Agreement. (R. 203, 234-35, and 23940.)
6. At issue in this case are the provisions of paragraph 11 of the Termination
Agreement which states as follows:
Purchase of Center. It is agreed that if within two (2) years
from the date of this Agreement, Physicians [Appellees
herein] sells the Center to any third party, Rehabilitation shall
be entitled to one third (1/3) of that portion of the purchase
price which is attributed to good will. 'Sale' shall be defined
as a transfer wherein the purchaser acquires and pays
consideration for all of the following: the Center's lease on
the Leased Sports Medicine Center, all of the equipment and
other assets located at the Center, the Center's
patient and accounts receivable, and whereby the purchaser
assumes complete operational control of the business of the
Center and continues operating under the same name at the
same location.
(A copy of the Termination Agreement is attached hereto as Addendum "A" and is by
reference made a part hereof.) (R. 8-15.)
7
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7. The only other consideration received by Rehabilitation for its inrerest in the
Center was the sum of $33,929.00 which Rehabilitation was obligated to pa^ to certain
lien holders to remove all encumbrances on the equipment which Rehabilitation was
selling to the Appellees, and $6,000.00 paid as reimbursement for services provided
Granite School District (See Addendum A) (R. 234-35, 239-40, and ^ 7 of the
Termination Agreement.)
8. Approximately one year later, the Appellees entered into a series of agreements
with IHC on May 24, 1990, for the purchase of an interest in the Center loc< ted at 670
East 3900 South as well as other Centers owned by Appellees located at 359 8th Avenue
and the part time clinic in Park City. These agreements included, but were hot limited to,
the following:
a. The Appellees and IHC entered into an Asset Purchase
Agreement whereby the Appellees purportedly sold to IHC an undivided
one-half interest in all assets of the three facilities. The personal property
sold is expressly defined in the Agreement and the description expressly
includes "good will". (See f 1(a) of the Asset Purchase Agreement wpich
was submitted for in camera review.)
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b. Contemporaneously with the execution of the Asset Purchase
Agreement, the Appellees executed a Special Warranty Bill of Sale and
Assignment whereby Salt Lake Knee & Sports Medicine transferred,
assigned and conveyed to IHC the assets described above. It also expressly
includes good will. (See the Special Warranty Bill of Sale and Assignment
submitted for in camera review).
c. Contemporaneously with the execution of the Asset Purchase
Agreement, the Appellees and IHC Hospitals entered into a Joint Venture
Agreement for Sports Medicine West wherein each of the parties agreed to
contribute to the newly created joint venture their 50% undivided interest in
the "Assets pursuant to the Asset Purchase Agreement", [sic] The Joint
Venture Agreement also states it was formed to "develop, construct,
finance, own and manage the Building and to own, manage, market and
operate the Businesses", (see ^[2.3 of the Joint Venture Agreement
submitted for in camera review.) The reference to the "building" refers to
the plans by the joint venture to construct a new building wherein the

9
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business of the two Centers would be conducted. One of the "Businesses'
was the Center at 3900 South.
d. Contemporaneously with the execution of all of the forego|ing,
Appellees and IHC executed a Special Warranty Bill of Sale and
Assignment whereby each transferred, assigned and conveyed to Sports
Medicine West, their respective undivided one-half interests. It expressly
lists "good will" as an asset being transferred. (See Special Warranty Bill of
Sale and Assignment submitted for in camera review.)
9. Subsequent to the execution of these documents, the joint venture continued to
do business at the 3900 South Center under the name "Salt Lake Sports Medicine Center"
Although the parties disagree as to how long it continued, the name "Salt Lake Sports
Medicine Center" was not changed to "Sports Medicine West" for a period or time which
Appellees admit was at least four months, and it is Rehabilitation's contention that the
name was not changed until almost one and one-half years later and only after
Rehabilitation filed this law suit in October of 1991. (R. 235 and 241.)
10. After learning of the transaction between the Appellees and IHC
Rehabilitation requested information from Appellees concerning it. Appellees refused to

10
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provide any information on the basis that the transaction was not a "sale" as defined by
the Termination Agreement. (R. 4.) Therefore, on or about October 4, 1991,
Rehabilitation filed its Complaint for Declaratory Judgment pursuant to Utah Code Ann.
§78-33-1 (1992) seeking, among other things, an order declaring as follows:
a. That a sale of the Center took place on or about the 24th day of
May, 1990 between the Appellees and IHC; and
b. That the sale was a "sale" within the meaning of the provisions of
paragraph 11 of the Termination Agreement between the parties and that
Rehabilitation is entitled to one-third of any amounts attributable to good
will. (R. 6-7.)
11. Appellees filed an Answer on or about October 30, 1991 (R. 39) but
subsequently, pursuant to Stipulation between the parties, filed an Amended Answer and
Counterclaim. (R. 143-65.) The Counterclaim was subsequently dismissed by stipulation
of the parties. (R. 356-57 and 411-12.)
12. On or about June 15, 1993, the Appellees filed a Motion for Summary
Judgment seeking to dismiss Rehabilitation's claims on the basis that Rehabilitation could
produce no evidence in support of its position that the transaction between the Appellees

11
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and IHC constituted a "sale" as that term is defined in the Termination Agreement. (R
168-96.)
13. Rehabilitation filed a Counter Motion for Partial Summary Judgment seeking
a declaration that the transaction between the Appellees and IHC was in fact) a "sale" as
that term was defined in the Termination Agreement and that Rehabilitation was entitled
to judgment against the Appellees in an amount to be proven at trial, representing onethird of the purchase price attributable to the purchase of good will. (R. 199J-225.)
Contemporaneously, Rehabilitation submitted the documents executed by th|p Appellees
and IHC for in camera review pursuant to the Protective Order dated on or \ bout August
17, 1992. (R. 226-28 and 464.)
14. The Court granted the Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment; denied
Rehabilitation's counter motion; and the order was entered on December 6, 993. (R.
358-360.)
15. After denial of Rehabilitation's Motion for Reconsideration, Rehabilitation
filed its Notice of Appeal on April 11, 1994. (R. 417-418.)
16. The appeal was poured over to the Utah Court of Appeals, (R. 4^9) which
subsequently reversed the Order of Summary Judgment and Dismissal with prejudice and

12
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remanded the case for the sole purpose of determining whether the joint venture
continued operating at the same location under the same name after the May 24, 1990
transaction. If so, this court held that Rehabilitation would be entitled to an award of onethird of the purchase price attributable to the purchase of goodwill. The Court of Appeals
ruling concluded that all other requirements listed in paragraph 11 had been satisfied. (A
copy of the decision is found at the end of volume 1 of the record and has been published
at Salt Lake Knee & Sports Rehabilitation v. Salt Lake Knee & Sports Medicine 909 P.2d
266 (Utah App 1995) For the court's convenience, a copy is attached hereto as
Addendum "B").
17. On or about the 19th day of December, 1997, after remand and some
additional discovery, the Appellees filed another Motion for Summary Judgment, this
time arguing that: 1) no part of the purchase price of the Center can be attributable to
good will as the entire amount paid over and above the cost of tangible assets was for a
non-competition agreement by the individual Appellees; and 2) because the documents do
not expressly recite that the joint venture purchased the name, "Salt Lake Sports Medicine
Center," the name was not sold. As a result, the Appellees argued that the requirements
of paragraph 11 have not been met. (Unfortunately, as counsel for Rehabilitation

13
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reviewed the record on appeal, the pages of volume two have not been numbered for
citation on appeal. Therefore, precise citation is not available. Instead a cd>py of the
motion and memorandum in support without exhibits are attached as addendum "C".)
18. Rehabilitation's argument in opposition to summary judgment yas five fold.
First, Rehabilitation argued that the documents do expressly and repeatedly recite that
good will was an asset being sold, and under the law, the name of a business is considered
an element of goodwill. Second, nothing supports Appellees' argument thai monies paid
were for non-competition agreements, and in fact, the documents establish otherwise.
Third, evidence that the name continued to be used by the joint venture for ^t least four
months (undisputed by Appellees) and as long as eighteen months after the Jtfay 1990
transaction establishes that it was in fact sold. Fourth, at the very least, the evidence that
the name was used creates a genuine issue of material fact precluding summary judgment
on the issue of whether the name was sold. Finally, Rehabilitation argued tljat this was
the first time this issue had been raised since the suit was filed in October off 1991,and
also at the very least, Appellant was entitled to continue the trial and condudt additional
discovery. (See a copy of Plaintiff s Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion
for Summary Judgment without exhibits, attached as addendum "D".)

14
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19. After oral argument, the lower court granted Defendants' Motion for
Summary Judgment. The order was entered on February 10, 1998, and subsequently
modified by Order Granting Plaintiffs Objection to Defendant's Order on Summary
Judgment dated April 3, 1998. (See addendum "E" for copies of both.)
20. The Notice of Appeal (originally designated as a cross-appeal) was filed on
April 28, 1998. The matter was poured over to this court by notice dated June 1, 1998.
(See last pages of volume 2.)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The lower court erred in finding that the May 1990 transaction did not include the
sale of the name Salt Lake Sports Medicine Center and granting summary judgment
against Rehabilitation on this basis. First, the sale issue on remand was whether the joint
venture purchased continued to use the name after the sale. Next, the court's reliance on
the omission of the name from the list of assets is contrary to the law. And, finally, if the
issue is a factual one properly considered by the court, genuine issues of material fact
preclude summary judgment.

15

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

ARGUMENT
On appeal is the lower court's dismissal of the Appellant's Complaiqt for
Declaratory Relief by entry of its Order Granting Defendants' Motion for Siimmary
Judgment. The language of the Order must be read in conjunction with the Order
Granting Plaintiffs Objection to Defendant's Order on Summary Judgment This latter
order struck certain language included in the original order. Reading the two orders
together, the court's specific basis for granting summary judgment was as follows:
The Court grants the Motion for Summary Judgment on the ba|sis
that Plaintiff has failed to produce any competent evidence raising a
genuine dispute of material fact on the issue that the name "Salt Lakel Sports
Medicine Center" was sold to IHC or a third party. The Defendants
produced unequivocal testimony that said name was not sold. [Language
stricken by Order Granting Plaintiffs Objection] Plaintiff did not coipe
forward with any competent evidence that the name was sold.
Consequently, under Paragraph 11 of the Termination Agreement datbd
May 22, 1989, Summary Judgment against the Plaintiffs, dismissing iheir
complaint, is proper as a matter of law.
To reach this conclusion, the court erred in two respects. First, the court erred in
failing to apply the appropriate law to the Appellees' arguments on summary judgment,
even before analyzing whether the facts were in dispute. Second, the evidenbe before the
court clearly established a genuine issue of material fact, thus precluding summary
judgment. To begin first with the error of law, in granting summary judgment, and
16
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although some of this language was subsequently stricken, the court relied primarily on
the fact that nowhere in the myriad of documents which encompass the IHC/joint venture
transaction in this matter is the name "Salt Lake Sports Medicine Center" expressly listed
as an asset being sold. However, in reaching this conclusion, the lower court wholly
ignored the law, and the generally accepted definition of goodwill.
Beginning first with the definition of "goodwill", this court has defined it as
follows:
Good will is a common law concept, defined variously as 'nothing
more than the probability that the old customers will resort to the old place,'
. . . or 'the advantage or benefit, which is acquired by an establishment,
beyond the mere value of the capital stock, funds, or property employed
therein, in consequence of the general public patronage and encouragement
which it receives from constant or habitual customers, on account of its
local position, or common celebrity, or reputation for skill or affluence, or
punctuality, or from other accidental circumstances, or necessities, or even
from ancient partialities or prejudices.'
Southern Utah Mortuary v. Olpin 776 P.2d 945, 948 (Utah App. 1989) citing Nims, The
Law of Unfair Competition and Trademarks. § 13 at 74-74 (4th ed. 1947). (See also, the
definition of good will in the case of Sorensen v. Sorensen. 769 P.2d 820 (Utah App.
1989) where this court added that "goodwill is referred to generally as 'the summation of
all the special advantages, not otherwise identifiable, related to a going concern. It

17
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includes such items as a good name, capable staff and personnel, high credit standing,
reputation for superior products and services and favorable location." Id. (emphasis
added).)
The Court in Southern Utah Mortuary went on to hold that the omission of the
word "goodwill" from documents comprising the sale of the business at issue therein did
not mean that good will was not sold. Instead, this court stated that, "[g]ood will cannot
be transferred apart from the business with which it is connected. Consequently, the sale
of a business presumptively includes the sale of the business's good will, even though it is
not specified." See Southern Utah Mortuary. 776 P. 2d at 748. And, although in the
Southern Utah Mortuary case the seller had expressly sold the name to another party prior
to the sale at issue on appeal, this Court recognized that "[gjood will may be represented
by a trade mark or a trade name." Id. (emphasis added.)
Applying these principles to the facts of this case, it is clear under the law that
whether or not an asset is expressly mentioned in the documents encompassing the sale of
a business does not mean that the asset was not sold. It is also clear that good will is that
intangible for which a buyer is willing to pay in excess of the cost of the hard assets, and
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this intangible includes by its very nature, the name and location of a business, as these
are the elements most easily recognizable by the consuming public.
Finally, although not expressly listed, the name was also not expressly excluded.
Instead, it is clear from the description of the assets sold in the May, 1990 transaction that
nothing was retained by Appellees and that the sale was inclusive of each and every
interest in the Center. For example, paragraph la of the Asset Purchase Agreement states
as follows:
(a) Personal Property and Accounts. Seller's right, title and
interest in and to all furniture, fixtures, equipment, appliances,
inventory, uniforms, promotional materials, printed matters,
supplies, books, records, prepaid expenses, prepaid taxes,
prepaid contractual payments and deposits, cash on hand,
bank deposits, accounts receivable and proceeds and products
thereof, records pertaining to accounts receivable, causes of
action, licenses, miscellaneous personal property, goodwill
and general intangibles, with respect to the Rehab Facilities
and the Park City Facilities, including, without limitation, the
property and items described on Exhibit "A" attached hereto
(collectively, the "Personal Property and Accounts.").
The other documents which comprise the transaction are likewise all inclusive. If
anything had been retained, it should have been listed as such. It was not.
Therefore, the lower court's analysis in this case must fail as a matter of law as it is
a too restrictive and narrow interpretation of the facts and circumstances of this case.
19
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Instead, looking at this case in its entirety, it is clear that, at the time the parties entered
into the Termination Agreement in 1989, the Appellees recognized that Rehabilitation
had contributed something of value to the reputation of the ongoing business known as
"Salt Lake Sports Medicine Center". Otherwise, Appellees, who drafted the Termination
Agreement, would not have included paragraph 11 and the clause over which the parties'
are currently arguing. Paragraph 11 makes it clear that the Appellees recognized that
both the name "Salt Lake Sports Medicine Center" and the 3900 South location had
acquired goodwill as that term is defined above and that Rehabilitation, as physical
therapists providing services in conjunction with the medical services provided by
Appellees, contributed to that good will. In other words, the Center had acquired a
reputation as a full service sports medicine center where an injured party could have all of
his/her needs met in the medical and therapeutic treatment of sports injuries. Looking at
the May, 1990 transaction, wherein Appellees sold the "Center" and given the significant
disparity between the ultimate purchase price for the "Center" and the negligible value of
tangible assets, it is this reputation, evidenced by the name, that was the primary asset
sold by Appellees in the May 1990 transaction.

20
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Looking at it another way, if, as the Appellees are now arguing, the only good will
in this entire matter is attributable to the independent reputations of the individual
surgeons, then paragraph 11 of the Termination Agreement is meaningless. It is of
course, a very basic tenet of contract law that the court must avoid an interpretation of a
contract which renders it meaningless. This is especially true where the drafter of the
contract is the party who is propounding the interpretation which renders its own contract
meaningless. If Rehabilitation had made absolutely no contribution to the good will at
issue, why did Appellees present them with and why did the parties sign a contract which
grants Rehabilitation an interest in an asset with significant monetary value? Clearly,
Appellees' current position is in stark contrast to their position and their conduct in 1989.
Instead, looking at the circumstances of this matter as a whole, the parties had been
in business together offering medical and therapeutic services for the treatment of sports
injuries for several years. In 1989, they went their separate ways, subject to each parties'
rights and obligations pursuant to the terms of the Termination Agreement. Among the
obligations imposed upon Appellees by the Agreement was the obligation to pay a
portion of the proceeds of a future sale of the Center if the sale occurred within two years.
It did. In May of 1990, the Appellees sold the Center, for a significant amount of money
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over and above the value of tangible assets. The sale expressly included the sale of "good
will", without on the one hand, listing the sale of the name, and on the other hand, without
defining "good will" as limited to the reputations of the individual Appellees or expressly
excluding the namefromthe sale. Thereafter, the Center continued to operate at the same
location and under the same name for at least four and as many as eighteen months after
the sale. As a result, the joint venture which purchased the Center received the benefit
from the public recognition of the name, "Salt Lake Sports Medicine Center". Based on
this scenario, Rehabilitation is clearly entitled to an award of one-third of the purchase
price attributable to good will.
At the very least, the court committed its second error in granting summary
judgment in the face of genuine issues of material fact. This is especially true where the
court has an obligation to review the facts in a light most favorable to the non-moving
party. The only evidence in the Appellees' favor is the omission of the name from the
documents (which is legally insufficient) and the unsupported, clearly self serving
affidavit of Lonnie Paulos, an individual Appellee, that the name was not sold. In
contrast are the affidavits of Gene Oaks, business manager for the Center and a witness
for Appellees, that the joint venture continued to use the name for at least four months
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after the sale, and the affidavits of two people not a party to this action, Gene Mayer, a
licensed physical therapist who worked with Drs. Paulos and Rosenberg at all times
pertinent to this dispute, and Jamie Beers, an ex-ray technician at the 3900 South Center
(see addendum "F"). Both have testified that the name of the Center was changed only
after this lawsuit was filed. If this is the case, the joint venture buyer used the name for
over eighteen months after the sale in May of 1990. Appellants would submit that the
right to use a name and the use of the name, for whatever period of time, and even the
right to stop using the name, are strong indicia of ownership. The only argument which
Appellees could possibly use to counter this evidence is to argue that the use of the name
was incidental and meaningless. This argument once again runs afoul of the clear
purpose of paragraph 11 of the Termination Agreement. At the time they drafted the
Agreement and presented it to Rehabilitation to sign, Appellees' had to have believed that
the name had value as they made its sale and continued use at the same location a
condition of the pay out which Rehabilitation seeks in this action.
One more point must be made. At no time prior to the motion for summary
judgment at issue on appeal have Appellees taken the position that something was not
sold. First, they argued that they sold only a one-half interest in everything. This court
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rejected that argument, holding that the transfer to the joint venture was a sale of
Appellees' entire interest. Faced now with the only issue being the continued use of the
name at the same location (which Appellees' own evidence establishes) they now argue
that an entire asset was not sold at all. Not only does this late effort to create a new issue
lack all credibility, the Appellees should not have been allowed by the lower court to
make arguments which clearly exceed the well-defined scope of this court's instructions
on remand. The Order Granting Defendants Motion for Summary Judgment must be
vacated.
CONCLUSION
Giving paragraph 11 of the Termination Agreement meaning as required by law,
and assessing the totality of the facts and circumstances of this matter from 1989 to the
present, it is clear that the lower court erred in granting summary judgment. It allowed
Appellees to raise an issue well beyond the scope of remand. Then, in resolving that
issue, the court's reliance on the omission of the name from the list of assets sold as the
primary basis for the summary judgment is an error as a matter of law. When a business
is sold, there is a presumption that good will has likewise been sold, and when good will
is sold, there is a presumption that the name is sold. Even if the court could overcome
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these legal principles, the facts and circumstances as outlined herein create, at the very
least, a genuine dispute of material facts. Thus, the court erred in granting summary
judgment.
This court should vacate the order granting summary judgment; it should enter its
own order declaring that all terms and provisions of paragraph 11 of the Termination
Agreement have been satisfied as a matter of law; and it should remand this matter for the
sole determination of the amount of the purchase price attributable to the purchase of
goodwill.
DATED this

day of January, 1998.
GREEN & LJUHN, P.C.

tiff/Appellant
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CERTIFICATE OF HAND DELIVERY
I hereby certify that on the
day of January, 1999,1 caused to be hand
delivered, a true and correct copy of the foregoing to the following:

Robert S. Campbell
CAMPBELL MOXLEY & CAMPBELL
Broadway Center, Suite 880
111 East Broadway
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
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TERMINATION AGREEMENT
AND
PURCHASE AGREEMENT
Agreement dated this

1989,

I

cdpi

'Z/^day of

/A/ ^fr\\ //
/^/

•,

between Salt Lake Knee and Sports Rehabilitation, Inc.

(hereinafter referred to as "Rehabilitation"), and Salt Lake
City Knee k Sports Medicine (hereinafter referred to as
"Physicians").
WHEREAS Salt Lake Sports Medicine Center
(hereinafter referred to as •Medicine") and Rehabilitation
entered into a Professional Services Contract and Lease
Agreement dated September 23, 1987 (hereinafter referred to
as the "Agreement"); and
WHEREAS Medicine gave to Rehabilitation a Notice
of Termination dated January 19, 198 9 pursuant to the terms
of the Agreement; and
WHEREAS Physicians is the successor in interest to
Medicine; and
WHEREAS Rehabilitation desires to s e l l to
Physicians and Physicians desire to purchase from
Rehabilitation certain equipment owned by Rehabilitation and
currently located at the office of Rehabilitation at 670
East 3900 South, Salt Lake City, Utah;
Now, therefore, in consideration of the mutual
covenants set forth below, the parties hereto agree as
follows:
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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DEPOSITION

I

CVUIDIT

I

-21.

Termination.

The Agreement i s hereby

terminated e f f e c t i v e April 19, 198 9, subject to the
p r o v i s i o n s of paragraph 13 of that Agreement which by i t s
terms survives the termination of the Agreement.
2.

Vacation of Premises.

Rehabilitation shall

vacate the premises at 670 East 3 900 South f S a l t Lake City,
Utah, (hereinafter referred to as the "Leased Premises")
which i s the subject of the Agreement, no l a t e r than Sunday,
April 2 3 , 1989 at 12:00 Midnight.
3.

Release of Claims.

The p a r t i e s hereto hereby

r e l e a s e each other and their predecessors in i n t e r e s t and
p r i n c i p a l s for a l l claims and l i a b i l i t y to each other
a r i s i n g out of the Agreement or the p a r t i e s ' performance
thereunder/ except for any claims a r i s i n g out of paragraph
11 and paragraph 13 of the Agreement, which claims are
s p e c i f i c a l l y reserved by the p a r t i e s .
4.

Sale of Equipment.

R e h a b i l i t a t i o n hereby

s e l l s to Physicians and Physicians hereby purchase from
Rehabilitation that equipment owned by R e h a b i l i t a t i o n and
currently located a t the "Leased Premises" which i s set
forth in Exhibit A attached hereto and incorporated herein
by reference (hereinafter referred to as the "Equipment").
5.

Purchase Price.

The purchase p r i c e for the

Equipment shall be Thirty-Three Thousand Nine Hundred and
Twenty-Nine
Dollars ($33,929.00) and s h a l l be paid to
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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-3Rehahilitation by Physicians in cash at the time of Closing,
subject to the provisions of paragraph 7 below.
6.

Payment of Costs in Connection with Granite

School D i s t r i c t High School Sports Medicine program.

In

addition to the purchase price for the Equipment, Physicians
s h a l l pay to Rehabilitation at Closing, subject to the
provisions of paragraph 7 below, the sum of Six Thousand
Dollars ($6,000.00), which represents reimbursement t o
Rehabilitation for costs incurred by Rehabilitation in
connection with R e h a b i l i t a t i o n ' s participation in Medicine's
Granite School D i s t r i c t High School Sports Medicine Program.
1.-

Liens and Encumbrances,

It i s understood by

the p a r t i e s that the Equipment i s encumbered by a s e c u r i t y
i n t e r e s t held by West One Bank (as successor in i n t e r e s t of
Tracy Collins Bank and Trust Company) t o secure payment of a
current balance owing of Forty-One Thousand Three Hundred
Eighty-One and 37/100 d o l l a r s ($41,381.37).

In a d d i t i o n ,

it

i s understood that the Equipment, as well as c e r t a i n
equipment previously sold by Rehabilitation to Physicians
(in approximately September of 198 7) i s encumbered by a
s e c u r i t y i n t e r e s t held by Capital City Bank (as successor in
i n t e r e s t of Union Bank)*

Rehabilitation shall insure that

those encumbrances are cleared and released in connection
with the purchase hereunder.

In that regard, i t

is

understood that at Closing the payments to be made to
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Rehabilitation shall be paid jointly to Rehabilitation and
West One Bank.

Rehabilitation shall then use those funds

together with such of its own funds as necessary to
immediately pay off the amount owing to West One Bank and
procure and have filed a termination of West One's security
interest against the Equipment.

It is anticipated that the

parties will together proceed directly from the Leased
Premises to the West One Bank on the day of Closing to make
certain that the above-described procedure is accomplished.
8.

Closing. Closing shall occur at the Leased.

Premises at a time mutually agreeable to the parties, but in
no event later than Friday, May 5, 1989 at 5:00 p.m.

At

closingf Physicians or their representative shall take a
physical inventory of the Equipment.

At closing,

Rehabilitation shall provide to Physicians written
verification from Capital City Bank (as successor in
interest to Union Bank) that any liens or security interests
that entity may have against the Equipment and against any.
equipment Physicians or its partners may have previously
purchased from Rehabilitation (including without limitation
the physical therapy equipment located at 3 59 8th Avenue
which was purchased in approximately September of 198 7) have
been terminated.

Upon verification of the presence of each

item of Equipment, and upon receipt of the verification
required above, physicians shall deliver to Rehabilitation a
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-5check made payable to Rehabilitation and West One Bank for
the entire purchase price of the Equipment together with the
payment referred to in paragraph 6 above,
9.

Warranties.

Rehabilitation warrants that it

owns the Equipment, free from any liens or encumbrances
except those referred to in paragraph 7 above, and has the
right to sell the same.

Rehabilitation further warrants

that all of the Equipment shall at the time of Closing be in
good working condition and free from defects.
10•

Coin Toss Regarding Murray High School»

Physicians and Rehabilitation acknowledge' that pursuant to
paragraph 13 of the Agreement, the right to be involved in a
Sports Medicine program at high schools which became a part
of Medicine1s High School Sports Medicine Program after the
effective date of the Agreement would be determined by a
toss of the coin.

The parties agree that Murray High School

fits into that category, and the parties therefore agree
that at Closing a coin toss shall be conducted between
Physicians and Rehabilitation, with the winner of that coin
toss having the sole right to conduct a Sports Medicine
Program at Murray High School, free from competition from
the loser of that coin toss.
11.

Purchase of Center.

It is agreed that if

within two (2) years from the date of this Agreement,
Physicians sells the Center to any third party.
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-6Rehabilitation shall be entitled to one-third (1/3) of that
portion of the purchase price which is attributed to goodwill.

"Sale" shall be defined as a transfer wherein the

purchaser acquires and pays consideration for all of the
following:

The Centerfs lease on the Leased Premises,

ownership of the name "Sale Lake Sports Medicine Center,*
all of the equipment and other assets located at the Center,
the Center's patients and accounts receivable, and whereby
the purchaser assumes complete operational control of the
business of the Center and continues operating under the
same name at the same location.
12.

Binding Agreement.

This Agreement shall be

binding on and inure to the benefit of the parties, and
their heirs, successors, and assigns.
13.

Time.

Time is of the essence of this

Agreement.
14.

Attorneys Fees.

Should any party default in

or breach any of the covenants or agreements contained
herein, the defaulting or breaching party shall pay all
costs and expenses, including reasonable attorneys fees,
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-7which nay accrue from e n f o r c i n g t h i s Agreement, or

in

pursuing any remedy provided hereunder, or by a p p l i c a b l e
law.
SALT LAKE KNEE & SPORTS
REHABILITATION, INC.
Its

s£

-^Sss^TZ*

c

^r

SALT LAKE CITY KNEE & SPORTS
MEDICINE, a Utah P a r t n e r s h i p
By LONNIE E. PAULOS^ M . D . . I n c .
a Professional/Corporation,
General

By THOMAS.D. RDSEN2ERG, M.D., p.C.
a Professional Corporation,
• General Partner
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Exhibit "Ai".

pBYSICAt THERAPY EQUIPMENT •
3900 SOUTH CLINIC
•

BQCZPKSKT AT 70*

1
I
1
1
1
1
f
1
1
1

tro CURL

SMITH MACHINE (SQUAT)
CROSSOVER tPULLEY SYSTEM}
COMP07XR0W
LEG PRESS
TOTAL KIT
METTLER ULTRASOUND
MULTIPLEX STZKOLATOR
SCOTSMAN ZCZ MACHINE
riTROK CYCLE
MEOMETRIC XT-1000
EXAM TABLES (6 t $250 RA.)
CHATTAirOCA ZNTELECT STZM
EYDROCOLLATOR HOT PACE
WHIRLPOOL
MIXING VALVE
CAST CUTTERS
TOTAL:

PURCHASE
PRICE
1,217.00
1,1*5.00
1,392.00
1,299.00
1,550.00
1,411.00
907.00
1,677.00
1,092.00
907.00
2,036.00
1,050.00
1.330.00
€30.00
SOS.00
263.00
161.00
16,874.00

EQUIPMENT t 30*
' LCG EXTENSION
8RATSS CHZST PRESS
PULLOVER
AB CRUNCH
XIX COM
SAN! GRINDER
SANODOXE
TOTAL:

521.00
794.00
894.00
405.00
8.646.00
101.00
105.00
11,466.00

OPTICS EQUIPMENT • 70*
Z50TSC PSORES (4 g 270)
IBM WBEELWRI7ER
AMANO TIKE CLOCX
TYPEWRITER STARS
FXL2 CABINETS (2 £ 480J
POOT STOOL
WAZTZNC ROOM SOFA (1/2 J
LUNCHROOM TABLE
LCKCHROOM CHAIRS - 4
MICROWAVE
CHAIRS (3 f 154}
OESX
>•

756.00
490.00
210.00
32.00
672.00
25.00
229.00
56.00
26.00
70.00
462.00
559.00
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rrett, 849 P2d 578, 580 (Utah App.), cert
titf 860 P^d 943 (Utah 1993). This is
such a case.
?
or the foregoing reasons, I concur only in
result

1. Appeal and Error ^934(1)
I n d e t e r m i n i n g p r o p r i e t y 0 f grant
summary judgment, facts are viewed in I
most favorable to position of losing p a
Rules Civ.Proc., Rule 56(c), 28 U.S.OA.

upon

subsequent sale
fendant partnership *
assets and received o
^int venture which a
a^ement control of bui

2. Appeal and Error <3=>842(2)
J O 5«YNUMBERSYSTIMJ

-T LAKE KNEE & SPORTS REHAILITATION, INC., fka Professional
-..—«
terapy, Inc., Plaintiff and Appellant,
T LAKE CITY KNEE & SPORTS
EDICINE, a Utah general partnership;
mnie E. Paulos, M.D., P.C., a Utah
ofessional corporation; and Thomas
Rosenberg, M.D., P.C., a Utah profesinal corporation, general partners, Deidants and Appellees.
No. 940417-CA.
Court of Appeals of Utah.
Dec. 21, 1995.

Trial court's legal conclusions are
viewed for correctness.

John C. Green anc
Lake City, for AppeDa:

& Motions <3=>39

Mark 0. Morris anc
Salt Lake City, for Apr

Rules of civil procedure do not pn
for "motion for reconsideration" of UJ
court's ruling; however, motions so entitl
could be considered if they could have
<WWMAVA wc tuiioiuacu u uuzy cuiua naveprop!
erly been brought under some rule and we*l
merely incorrectly titled.

m

4. Appeal and Error <2>345.1
New Trial <3=>124(1)
Although plaintiff in breach of cont
action improperly entitled motion as "motiJ|
for reconsideration," after adverse de _
on summary judgment, motion was in |
sence motion for new trial, and thereto
filing motion tolled period for filing app
trial judge ruled on the motion as if it
motion for new trial. Rules Civ.Proc.,
59(a).
5. Joint Adventures ^ » 1 .

^ysical therapy corporation brought actgainst defendant partnership of physifor failure to pay amounts allegedly due
subsequent "sale" of sports medicine
>ss, as provided for in agreement termi\ professional services contract The
District Court, Salt Lake County, Ho'. Wilkinson, J., granted summary judgfor defendant, and denied plaintiffs
>n to reconsider." Plaintiff appealed,
ourt of Appeals, Davis, Associate P J.,
hat: (1) plaintiffs substantive motion
w trial tolled period for filing appeal;
w joint venture which acquired busias "third party" for purposes of agreeand (3) defendant obtained consider)r sale of business' assets.

Like partnerships, jpint ventures are',;;
distinct and separate leg^l entities. U.CJL"
1953, 48-1-3.1(1,2).
6. Contracts ^202(1)
Even though defendant partnership \._.
member of new joint venture, new joint veri^
ture was separate legal entity and as suchll
was "third party" for purposes of defendant
partnership's obligation to pay upon subset
quent sale of sports medicine business to:!
"third party," under agreement terminating!
professional services contract between plaiini
tiff physical therapy corporation and defeat
dant partnership of physicians.
7. Contracts <3=>202(1)

Defendant partnership of physicians w
ceived consideration for sale of assets^
nch, J., concurred and dissented, and sports medicine business, for purposes Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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subsequent sale of business, where defendant partnership was paid for one half of
assets and received one half interest in new
*oint venture which assumed complete management control of business.
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John C. Green and Kim M. Luhn, Salt
Lake City, for Appellant.
Mark 0. Morris and Jeffrey T. Sivertsen,
Salt Lake City, for Appellees.
Before DAVIS, BENCH and BILLINGS,
JJ.
DAVIS, Associate Presiding Judge:
Appellant, Salt Lake Knee & Sports Rehabilitation, Inc. (Rehabilitation) challenges
the trial court's order granting summary
judgment to appellees, Salt Lake City Knee
& Sports Medicine (Physicians), a general
partnership; and its general partners, Lonnie E. Paulos, M.D., P.C., a Utah professional corporation (Paulos); and Thomas D.
Rosenberg, M.D., P.C., a Utah professional
corporation (Rosenberg).' We reverse and
remand.
FACTS

equipment and other assets located at the
Center, the Center's patients and accounts
receivable, and whereby the purchaser assumes complete operational control of the
business of the Center and continues operating under the same name at the same
location.
On May 24, 1990, Physicians entered into
an asset purchase agreement with IHC Hospitals (IHC) pursuant to which Physicians
sold IHC an undivided one-half interest in
the Center. Physicians and IHC then
formed a joint venture called "Sports Medicine West" and transferred their respective
one-half interests thereto.
The joint venture continued to do business
at the Center's location and it temporarily
retained Physicians as its agent to manage
and operate the business. At some point in
time, Sports Medicine West changed the
Center's name from "Salt Lake Sports Medicine Center" to "Sports Medicine West"
The parties dispute precisely when Sports
Medicine West changed the Center's name,
however it is undisputed that the name was
not changed until at least one year before the
action in this case was filed, approximately
October 1990.

On October 4, 1991, Rehabilitation filed a
Rehabilitation and Physicians formerly
complaint
for declaratory relief, allegii)g that
worked together providing medical and physical therapy services at the Salt Lake Sports the transactions between IHC and PhysiMedicine Center (Center) located at 670 East cians constituted a "sale" under paragraph
3900 South, Salt Lake City, Utah, under the eleven of the Agreement Physicians filed a
terms of a professional services agreement motion for summary judgment on June 15,
On May 22,1989, these parties entered into a 1993, and Rehabilitation filed a counter-motermination agreement and purchase agree- tion for summary judgment shortly thereafment (Agreement) which terminated the par- ter.
ties' professional services contract. ParaAfter hearing oral argument on the mograph eleven of this Agreement stated:
tions, the trial court permitted further briefPurchase of Center. It is agreed that if ing on the parties' interpretations of the
within two (2) years from the date of this meaning of "sale" as defined by the AgreeAgreement, Physicians sells the Center to ment On November 15, 1993, the court
any third party, Rehabilitation shall be heard additional oral argument on the subentitled to one-third (%) of that portion of ject and ruled that to constitute a sale, the
the purchase price which is attributed to transaction "must include all of the following
tfood will. 'Sale' shall be defined as a . . . items [from paragraph eleven]. And
transfer wherein the purchaser acquires from those items, it must . . . [include] all of
and pays consideration for all of the follow- the equipment and assets, and they [the puring: The Center's lease on the Leased chaser] must have complete operational conPremises, ownership of the name 'Salt trol." The court ruled that the transfer of
by theall
Howard
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was not a sale and rejected Rehabilitation's
argument that the transfer of all assets to
the joint venture was a "sale." Therefore,
the court granted summary judgment in favor of Physicians on November 15, 1993.
Rehabilitation filed a "motion for reconsideration" of the trial court's ruling on November 29, 1993. The trial court heard the
motion on January 28, 1994, and again ruled
in favor of Physicians. An order to this
effect was entered on March 14, 1994. On
April 11, 1994, Rehabilitation filed this appeal.
ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
[1,2] There are essentially two issues
presented on appeal. The first issue con. cerns the timeliness of Rehabilitation's appeal. "[I]t is axiomatic in this jurisdiction
that failure to timely perfect an appeal is a
jurisdictional failure requiring dismissal of
the appeal." Prowswood, Inc. v. Mountain
Fuel Supply Co., 676 P.2d 952, 955 (Utah
1984). The second issue presented is whether the trial court erred in granting summary
judgment to Physicians based upon its conclusion that the transaction between IHC
and Physicians was not a "sale" within the
meaning of paragraph eleven of the Agreement. Summary judgment is appropriate in
a case where the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on
file, together with any affidavits, show there
is no genuine issue of material fact and that
the moving party is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law. Utah R.Civ.P. 56(c); Warburton v. Virginia Beach Fed. Sav. & Loan
Ass'n, 899 P.2d 779, 781 (Utah App.1995). In
determining the propriety of a grant of summary judgment, we view the facts in the light
most favorable to the position of the losing
party. Warburtxm, 899 P.2d at 781. We
review the trial court's legal conclusions for
correctness. Id.
ANALYSIS
1. Timeliness of the Appeal
[3] Physicians argues that Rehabilitation's motion for reconsideration did not toll

the running of the time in which to appeal,
and hence Rehabilitation's appeal was untimely.1 It is by now well established that
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure do not
provide for a "motion for reconsideration" of
a trial court's ruling. Ron Shepherd Ins^
Inc. v. Shields, 882 P.2d 650, 653 n. 4 (Utah
1994); accord Watkiss & Campbell v. Foa <fe
Son, 808 P.2d 1061,1064 (Utah 1991). Nonetheless, we have "reviewed motions so entitied if they could have properly been brought
under some rule and were merely incorrectly
titled." Shields, 882 P.2d at 653 n. 4; see
also Trembly v. Mrs. Fields Cookies, 884
P.2d 1306, 1310 n. 2 (Utah App.1994) (noting
that "the substance, not caption, of a motion
is dispositive in determining the character of
the motion").
[4] In this case, Rehabilitation captioned
its motion as a motion for reconsideration.
However, our review indicates that the substance of the motion was essentially identical
to a motion for new trial under Rule 59(a) of
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Specifically, Rehabilitation argued that the trial
court made several errors of law which are
grounds for relief under Rule 59(a)(7). In
addition, by conducting a hearing and reaffirming its legal conclusions, the trial court
ruled upon the motion as if it were a motion
for a new trial. Therefore, as iiy Watkiss &
Campbell,
[u]nder the facts of this case, the incorrect j£ :
title placed upon the pleading was not a
bar to defendant's case. Indeed, the re<s'
ord reflects that the judge ruled on the J|:
motion as if it were a motion for a new :*
trial. Because the court treated the mo- ^
tion to reconsider as a motion for a new
trial, we conclude that the filing of the motion tolled the time in which to file an
appeal.
Id. at 1064-65 (footnotes omitted).
We conclude that Rehabilitation's motion Jj :
to reconsider is substantively a motion for a ; | |

1. We have considered Physicians's other argumary judgment order, and reject them as being |p£
ments on this issue, including the contentions
without merit. See State v. Allen, 839 P.2d 291,\g|
that Rehabilitation simply filed a motion for clar303 (Utah 1992); State v. Carter, lit P.2d 8 8 6 , ^
ification and that there is some significance to be
888-89 (Utah 1989), cert, denied, — U.S.
%"M
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Cite as 909 P.2d 266 (UuhApp. 1995)

new trial, and as such it tolled the time for trib., Inc., 593 P.2d 542, 544 (Utah 1979)
filing an appeal. Rehabilitation's appeal was (noting partnership is legal entity distinct
from partners). Because these statutes apthus timely.2
ply equally to joint ventures, it follows that
2. Summary Judgment
joint ventures are also distinct and separate
The trial court granted Physicians's motion legal entities. See Sine, 767 P.2d at 501
for summary judgment on the basis that a (concluding that joint ventures have capacity
"sale" to a "third" party within the meaning to sue in their own names, relying on authorof paragraph eleven of the Agreement had ity treating partnerships as distinct entities).
not occurred. The court stated it was 44un[6] We therefore conclude that, under
persuaded" by Rehabilitation's argument
that all of the assets were transferred to the Utah law, joint ventures are separate legal
new joint venture, Sports Medicine West entities. Our conclusion is consistent with
Thus, the only transfer considered by the rulings in several other jurisdictions. See
court was the transfer of one-half of the Fairbanks N. Star Borough v. Kandik
interest in the Center to IHC. Because a Canstr., Inc., 795 P.2d 793, 802 (Alaska 1990)
transfer of less than "all" of the interest in (inferentially holding that joint venture is a
the Center does not trigger the "sale" defini- separate legal entity), vacated in part on
tion in paragraph eleven, the court granted other grounds, 823 P.2d 632 (Alaska 1991);
First State Serv. Corp. v. Hector's Concrete
summary judgment to Physicians.
Canstr., Inc., 168 Ariz. 442, 814 P.2d 783, 783
The trial court's rationale for rejecting Re(App.1991) (joint venture is a separate legal
habilitation's argument that all of the assets
entity); C.H. Leavell & Co. v. Tax Comm'n,
were transferred to the joint venture, Sports
450 P.2d 211, 214 (Okla.1968) (same); Lawler
Medicine West, is unclear. Physicians
v. Dallas Statler-Hitton Joint Venture, 793
claims, however, that because it is a co-owner
S.W.2d 27, 33 (Tex.CtApp.1990) (same).3
of Sports Medicine West, the joint venture
But see Lewis v. Gardner Eng'g Corp., 254
cannot be a <4third party" within the meaning
Ark. 17, 491 S.W2d 778, 779 (1973) (joint
of paragraph eleven. We disagree.
venture not a separate legal entity); Elting
[5] A joint venture is defined as "an asso- Ctr. Corp. v. Diversified Title Corp., 306
ciation of two or more persons to carry on as So.2d 542, 543 (Fla.DistCtApp.1974) (same),
co-owners of a single business enterprise." cert denied, 321 So.2d 554 (Fla.1975). As a
Utah Code Ann. § 48-1-3.1(1) (1994). Joint separate legal entity, Sports Medicine West
ventures are subject to the same rules as is a "third party" within the meaning of
partnerships. Id. § 4&-1-3.K2); Kemp v. paragraph eleven.
Murray, 680 P^d 758, 759 n. 1 (Utah 1984);
Hoth v. White, 799 P.2d 213, 218 (Utah App.
[7] In addition, Physicians was paid by
1990). Based upon the statutes governing IHC for an undivided one-half interest in its
partnerships, the Utah Supreme Court has assets, and it received a one-half interest in
ruled that partnerships are distinct and sepa- the joint venture for the other one-half of the
rate legal entities. See Cottonwood MoU Co. assets. Therefore, the paragraph eleven rev. Sine, 767 P.2d 499, 501 (Utah 1988) (noting quirement that consideration be paid for the
several sections of the Uniform Partnership assets was also satisfied. Sports Medicine
Act treating partnership as a separate legal West also has complete operational control of
entity); Wall Inv. Co. v. Garden Gate Dis- the Center as evidenced by the terms of the
2. Notwithstanding our conclusion, we are not
name of the pleading possibly obtained from a
approving the use of pleadings identified as
docket entry.
something not provided for in the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure. Such a practice could seriously
3. Louisiana has not adopted the Uniform Partcompromise the position of a litigant where a
nership Act, but also considers joint ventures to
"motion for reconsideration," for example, was
be separate legal entities. West Feliciana Parish
not substantively a motion enumerated under
Sch. Bd. v. Gulf States Utils. Co., 486 So.2d 808,
Rule 4(b) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Proce811 (La.Ct.App.1986).
dure, or where other litigants or third parties
by the only
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Management Agreement stating that Sports
Medicine West had complete "day-to day"
operational control of the rehabilitation business.
Finally, according to the parties, the only
remaining issue is whether the joint venture
continued operating the business under the
name "Salt Lake Sports Medicine Center."
The trial court did not reach this issue,4
notwithstanding disputed, material facts,
having resolved the matter on the issue of
sale of assets. Because of the existence of
disputed material facts, the issue of whether
the joint venture continued to operate the
business under the same name is remanded
to the trial court for determination.
CONCLUSION
The joint venture Sports Medicine West is
a distinct and separate legal entity from Physicians, and from Paulos and Rosenberg, the
general partners of Physicians. As such, it is
a "third person" within the meaning of paragraph eleven. In addition, consideration was
paid for the assets and Sports Medicine West
assumed full operational control of the Center. Thus, we reverse the trial court's grant
of summary judgment to Physicians based
upon the finding that only one-half of the
assets were transferred to IHC. It appears
that material issues of fact exist regarding
the question of whether Sports Medicine
West continued to operate the Center under
the same name. We therefore remand the
matter for further proceedings consistent
with this opinion.
BILLINGS, J., concurs.
BENCH, Judge (concurring and
dissenting):
I concur in holding that this appeal was
timely filed. I dissent, however, from the
reversal of the summary judgment.

1041, 1044 (Utah App.) (holding substance of
post-judgment motion controls, not caption),
cert denied 883 P.2d 1359 (Utah 1994). We
have previously held that a motion for a new
trial may properly befiledfollowing entry of
a summary judgment Moon Lake Eke.
Ass'n, Inc. v. UUrasystems W. Con&trs., /no,
767 P.2d 125, 127 (Utah App.1988). Our
rules explicitly provide that "the time for £
appeal for all parties shall runfromthe entry ^
of the order denying a new trial" Utah
R.App.P. 4(b). Thefilingof a motion under
Rule 59 therefore tolls the time for filing a
notice of appeal.

I

On the merits, I disagree with the main
opinion's analysis and result The contract
between the parties provides that Physicians
will share the sale proceeds attributable to
"good will" only when Physicians sell the
entire Center to a third party. In the transaction involving IHC, Physicians clearly retained an ownership interest in the Center.
The fact that the Center is now operated
as a joint venture does not lead to the result
reached by the main opinion. The joint venture statute provides that the only way Physicians can participate in a joint venture is if
it is a co-owner. See Utah Code Ann. § 481-3.1(1) (1995) ("[a] joint venture is an association of two or more persons to carry on as
co-owners of a single business enterprise.")
(emphasis added). Since Physicians indisputably remains a co-owner of the Center, it
has not sold it as contemplated by paragraph
eleven of the parties, agreement
I would therefore affirm the summary
judgment

Co f tVtNUMBERSYSTIM>

As to the timeliness of the appeal, I agree
that Rehabilitation's "motion for reconsideration" was essentially a Rule 59 motion for a
new trial. See State v. Parker, 872 P.2d
wits, the affidavit submitted by Physicians estab4. The trial court also did not reach the subsidiary
lishes nonetheless that the name of the business
issue of whether to strike the affidavits submitted
by Rehabilitation.
We
however,
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ROBERT S. CAMPBELL, JR. (0557)
KEVIN EGAN ANDERSON (0099)
CAMPBELL MAACK & SESSIONS
One Utah Center, Thirteenth Floor
201 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
(801) 537-5555
Attorneys for Defendants
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
SALT LAKE KNEE & SPORTS
REHABILITATION, INC., fka
PROFESSIONAL THERAPY, INC.,
Plaintiff,

DEFENDANTS' MOTION
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

vs.
SALT LAKE CITY KNEE & SPORTS
MEDICINE, a Utah general
partnership, LONNIE E. PAULOS,
M.D., P.C., a Utah
professional corporation and
THOMAS D. ROSENBURG, M.D.,
P.C., a Utah professional
corporation, general partners,

Civil No. 910906316 CN
Judge Homer F. Wilkinson

Defendants.

Pursuant to Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure,
Defendants Salt Lake City Knee and Sports Medicine, Lonnie E.
Paulos,

M.D.,

P.C.,

and

Thomas

D.

Rosenberg,

M.D.,

P.C.

respectfully move the Court for its order dismissing the above
captioned complaint for the reason that there are no material
disputed facts and summary judgment is proper as a matter of law.
This motion is based on the following grounds:
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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1.

This case involves the interpretation of a contract,

which is a legal issue preserved for the court.
2.

Plaintiff's claim for recovery is based on flll of the

Termination Agreement between the parties dated May 22, 1989.
3.

Pursuant to that contract provision, plaintiff is

entitled to a recovery only if the name "Salt Lake Sports Medicine
Center" was sold, and if some portion of the purchase paid for the
Salt Lake Sports Medicine Center assets is attributed to goodwill.
4.

The evidence is undisputed that the name "Salt Lake

Sports Medicine Center" was not sold by IHC or any third party.
5.

The evidence is also undisputed that no portion of the

purchase price paid by IHC to acquire certain assets of Salt Lake
Sports Medicine Center were attributable to goodwill.
6.

Because there are no factual disputes, and the

interpretation and construction of the subject contract is a
matter of law, summary judgment on this case is appropriate as a
matter of law.
For the reasons set forth herein, and in the Memorandum of
Points and Authorities

filed

concurrently

herewith, summary

judgment dismissing complaint should be granted as a matter of
law.
DATED t hLis
:
/&*£
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ROBERT S. CAMPB
KEVIN EGAN ANDERSO
of and for
CAMPBELL MAACK & SESSIONS
Attorneys for Defendants
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law firm of Campbell Maack & Sessions, One Utah Center, Thirteenth
Floor, 201 South Main Street, Salt Lake City, Utah, 84111, and
that in said capacity and pursuant to Rule 5(b), Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, a true and correct copy

of the foregoing

DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT was served upon:
John C. Green, Esq.
Kim M. Luhn, Esq.
GREEN & LUHN, P.C.
722 Boston Building
9 Exchange Place
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
*n this^^g? day of December, 1997.
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I hereby certify that I am a member of and/or employed by the
law firm of Campbell Maack & Sessions, One Utah Center, Thirteenth
jFlcor, 201 South Main Street, Salt Lake City, Utah, 84111, and
that in said capacity and pursuant to Rule 5(b), Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, a true and correct copy

of the

foregoing

DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT was served upon:
John C. Green, Esq.
Kim M. Luhn, Esq.
GREEN & LUHN, P.C.
722 Boston Building
9 Exchange Place
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
by U. S. Mail, postage prepaid.
DATED this

day of December, 1997.
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ROBERT S. CAMPBELL, JR. (0557)
KEVIN EGAN ANDERSON (0099)
CAMPBELL MAACK & SESSIONS
One Utah Center, Thirteenth Floor
201 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
(801) 537-5555
Attorneys for Defendants
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
SALT LAKE KNEE & SPORTS
REHABILITATION, INC., fka
PROFESSIONAL THERAPY, INC.,
Plaintiff,

DEFENDANTS' MEMORANDUM OF
POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN
SUPPORT OF THEIR MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

vs.
SALT LAKE CITY KNEE & SPORTS
MEDICINE, a Utah general
partnership, LONNIE E. PAULOS,
M.D., P.C , a Utah
professional corporation and
THOMAS D. ROSENBURG, M.D.,
P.C, a Utah professional
corporation, general partners,

Civil No. 910906316 CN
Judge Homer F. Wilkinson

Defendants.

Defendants, Salt Lake City Knee & Sports Medicine Center,
Lonnie E. Paulos, M.D., P.C, and Thomas D. Rosenburg, M.D., P.C
(the "Defendants") , respectfully submit this Memorandum of Points
and Authorities in Support of their Motion for Summary Judgment.
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STATEMENT OF UNDISPUTED FACTS
1.

On or about May 22, 1989, Plaintiff and Defendant Salt

Lake City Knee and Sports Medicine entered into a Termination
Agreement and Purchase Agreement ("Termination Agreement") which,
'among other things, terminated a Professional Services Contract
and Lease Agreement entered into on or about September 23, 1987
between Plaintiff and Salt Lake Sports Medicine Center. Complaint
56; Amended Answer 57. A true and correct copy of the Termination
Agreement is attached hereto as Exhibit "A" the terms of which are
incorporated herein by this reference.
2.

Paragraph 11 of the Termination Agreement provides in

[pertinent part as follows:
11. Purchase of Center. It is agreed that
if within two (2) years from the date of this
Agreement, Physicians [Defendant, Salt Knee &
Sports Medicine] sells the Center [Salt Lake
Sports Medicine Center] to any third party,
Rehabilitation [Plaintiff Salt Lake Knee and
Sports Rehabilitation, Inc.] shall be
entitled to one-third (1/3) of that portion
of the purchase price which is attributable
to good will. "Sale" shall be defined as a
transfer wherein the purchaser acquires and
pays consideration for all of the following:
the Center's lease on the leased premises,
ownership of the name "Salt Lake Sports
Medicine Center," all of the equipment and
other assets located at the Center, and the
Center's patients and accounts receivable,
and whereby the purchaser assumes complete
operational control of the business of the
Center and continues operating under the same
name at the same location.

j

3.

On or about May 24, 1990, defendant Salt Lake City Knee

and Sports Medicine entered into an Asset Purchase Agreement with
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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IHC Hospitals, Inc.

(the "IHC Agreement").

Complaint, f8;

Affidavit of Dr. Paulos at flO, ATTACHED HERETO AS Exhibit "B".
4.

Pursuant to the IHC Agreement, Salt Lake City Knee and

Sports Medicine sold to IHC a one-half interest in the medical
practices it owned and operated at its clinics at Eighth Avenue in
Salt Lake City; at 3900 South, and also at Park City, together
with certain related assets.

The other one-half interest was

conveyed to a joint venture between IHC and Salt Lake City Knee
and Sports Medicine Center, known as Sports Medicine West.
Affidavit of Dr. Paulos at flO.
5.

Drs. Paulos and Rosenberg had a very small practice at

3900 South.

It was a fraction of their 8th Avenue practice.

In

connection with the sale to IHC, a one-half (1/2) interest in
certain equipment of the Salt Lake Sports Medicine Center was sold
to IHC. However, the name "Salt Lake Sports Medicine Center11 was
not among the assets sold to IHC or conveyed to Salt Lake Sports
Medicine Center.
6.

Dr. Paulos Affidavit at HflO and 11.

IHC did not seek to acquire the name "Salt Lake Sports

Medicine Center"; it did not pay any consideration for the
acquisition thereof;

and it did not purchase or acquire that

name, or any interest therein. Further, Salt Lake Sports Medicine
Center and Salt Lake Knee and Sports Medicine Center did not sell
to IHC or convey to the Sports Medicine West any interest in the
name "Salt Lake Sports Medicine Center."

Dr. Paulos Affidavit at

511; Deposition of Greg Gardner at 41-44, attached hereto as
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Exhibit "C".; Deposition of Douglas Toole at 85, attached hereto
as Exhibit "D".
|

7.

No portion of the purchase price paid by IHC to acquire

assets of the Salt Lake Sports Medicine Center were attributed to
the good will.

Dr. Paulos Affidavit at 115, attached here as

Exhibit "B".
8.

IHC paid $662,225.00 to acquire a one-half interest in

the clinics and practices owned and operated by Dr. Lonnie Paulos
and Dr. Thomas Rosenberg, and their entities on Eighth Avenue and
in Park City and certain assets of Salt Lake City Knee and the
Salt Lake Sports Medicine and the Sports Medicine Center which
operated at 3900 South and in consideration of the non-competition
agreement signed by Drs. Paulos and Rosenberg, the multiples paid
by IHC was for the non-competition agreement.

Dr. Paulos

Affidavit at 512-15, attached hereto as Exhibit "B".
9.

When

the

lease

with

Salt

Lake

Knee

and

Sports

Rehabilitation, Inc. at 3900 South was terminated on May 22, 1989
Gregory Gardner, Douglas Toole and their entity Salt Lake Knee and
iSports Rehabilitation, Inc., took their patients and relocated
their

practice,

continuing

their

rehabilitation

practice.

Deposition of Gregory Gardner at 39-40, attached hereto as Exhibit
"C".
10.

On or about October 9, 1991 the Plaintiff Salt Lake

Sports Knee and Sports Rehabilitation, an entity owned by Gregory
Gardner and Douglas Toole, filed an action against the Defendants
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Salt Lake Knee and Sports Medicine and Dr. Lonnie Paulos, M.D.,
p.C. and Thomas Rosenberg, M.D., P.C. to recover one-third of the
good will attributable to the sale certain of assets of the Salt
Lake Sports Medicine Center to IHC.
11.

On or about June 15, 1993, Defendants filed a Motion

for Summary Judgment on the basis that no sale of all of the
assets of Salt Lake Sports Medicine Center was made to a third
party that assumed complete operational control of the business of
the Center.
12.

This Court granted summary judgment by Order dated

December 6, 1993.
13.

By Order dated March 14, 1994, this Court granted

Reconsideration and affirmed Summary Judgment.
14.

Plaintiffs appealed this Court's decision to the Utah

Court of Appeals.

By Opinion filed December 21, 1995, the Court

of Appeals reversed summary judgment on a narrow basis.

It held

that the sale of certain assets by Salt Lake Sports Medicine
Center was a sale to a "third party" within the meaning of
paragraph 11. Court of Appeals Slip Opinion at 5.
15.

The Appellate Court's rationale was that one-half of the

interest was sold to IHC, a third party, and Salt Lake Knee and
Sports Medicine transferred the other half to a joint venture
known

as

Sports

determined

was

a

Medicine
separate

West, which

the

legal entity.

Appellate

Consequently,

determined the sale was to a third party. Id.
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Court
it

16. The issue of whether the name "Salt Lake Sports Medicine
Center" was ever sold by Defendants to IHC or Sports Medicine West
jwas not raised by the prior summary judgment motion nor was it an
issue before the Court of Appeals, and consequently was not
decided by the Court of Appeals.
17.

The Court of Appeals also did not determine whether the

"joint venture between IHC and Salt Lake City Knee and Sports
Medicine continued operating the business under the name "Salt
Lake Sports Medicine Center."
18.

Neither did the Appellate Court consider or determine

what, if any, portion of the purchase price paid for the certain
of the assets of the Center were attributable to good will.
ARGUMENT
This case can and should be disposed of by summary judgment,
as a matter of law for two unavoidable reasons, not previously
raised in this case nor considered or disposed of by the Court of
Appeals:
1.

The provisions of paragraph

11 of the Termination

Agreement are triggered only if the name "Salt Lake Sports
Medicine Center" were sold to a third party.

But that name was

not sold to IHC, Sports Medicine West, or any other third party.
Consequently, there is no liability.
2.

No portion of the purchase price paid by IHC to acquire

certain assets from Salt Lake City Knee and Sports Medicine Center
were attributed to good will.

Because no consideration was paid
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to acquire good will, plaintiff is not entitled to any recovery.
As set forth below, the interpretation of these contract
provisions is strictly a legal question properly resolved by
summary judgment. Moreover, discovery is now concluded, and there
are no disputed facts affecting these issues.

Consequently,

summary judgment should be entered as a matter of law.
I
THE ISSUES PRESENTED ARE LEGAL ISSUES PROPERTY RESOLVED BY
SUMMARY JUDGMENT
This Court should grant summary judgment when the record
shows that "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and
that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law"
Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). Indeed the Utah Supreme Court has declared
that summary judgment shall be rendered under these circumstances:
Under Rule 56(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure, summary judgment shall be rendered
if the record demonstrates that "there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and
that the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.
Webster v. Sillr 675 P.2d 1170, 1172 (Utah 1983) (emphasis added).
Suummary judgment serves a salutary purpose in promoting
judicial efficiency and avoiding unnecessary trials by permitting
the parties to pierce the pleadings and determine whether there
are genuine issues to present to the fact finder.
A major purpose of summary judgment is to
avoid unnecessary trial by allowing the
parties to pierce the pleadings to determine
whether there is a genuine issue to present
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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to the fact finder. In accordance with this
purpose, specific facts are required to show
whether there is a genuine issue for trial.
The allegations of a pleading or factual
conclusions of an affidavit are insufficient
to raise a genuine issue of fact.
Reagan Outdoor Advertising, Inc. v. Lundgrenr 692 P.2d 776, 779
(Utah 1984); Webster v. SillP 675 P.2d at 1172 (Utah 1983)(a major
of purpose of summary judgment is to allow the pierce the
pleadings to determine whether there is a genuine issue of fact).
Even, "the mere existence of some alleged factual dispute
between the

parties will not

defeat

an otherwise properly

supported motion." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242,
1247-48 (1986) (emphasis by Court) . Instead, summary judgment is
mandated if "after adequate time for discovery and upon motion
...party ... fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the
existence of an element essential to that parties case, on which
that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Celotex Corp.
v. Catrett. 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986).
In moving

for

summary

judgment,

the movant

need

not

affirmatively demonstrate the absence of elements critical to the
Plaintiff's case.

Instead, the non-moving party has the burden

to

with

come

forward

evidence

demonstrating

the

requirements of its case.
[W]e do not think the Adickes language
quoted above should be construed to mean
that the burden on the party moving for
summary judgment to produce evidence
showing the absence of a genuine issue
of material fact, even with respect to
an issue on which the non-moving party
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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elemental

bears the burden of proof. Instead, as
we have explained, the burden on the
moving party may be discharged by
"showing" — that is, pointing out to the
District Court — that there is an
absence of evidence to support the nonmoving partyfs case.
Id. at 325 (emphasis added).
j

There are no disputed issues of fact on either of the grounds

on which this summary judgment motion is based.

The issues

presented are contract issues. The contract language is clear and
unambiguous and speaks for itself.
as a matter of law.

Consequently, it is construed

Morris v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co.f

658 P.2d 1199 (Utah 1983):
The interpretation of a contract is a
question of law, to be decided by the judge,
. . .

More importantly, our recent cases hold that
even the resolution of contract ambiguities
is a question of law for the court.
I

For

that

reason,

summary

judgment

is

a

particularly

appropriate and helpful tool in this contract litigation. Indeed,
the Utah Supreme Court has repeatedly affirmed the use of summary
judgment in contract cases.
When the existence of a contract and
identity of its parties are not in issue
when the contract provisions are clear
complete, the meaning of the contract
appropriately be resolved by the court
summary judgment.
Id. at 1201 (emphasis added).

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

4

the
and
and
can
on

II.
THE NAME "SALT LAKE SPORTS MEDICINE CENTER"
WAS NEVER SOLD TO IHC OR SPORTS MEDICINE WEST.
Paragraph 11 of the Termination Agreement is the operative
provision that determines and specifies under what circumstances
plaintiff was entitled to any payment in the event Salt Lake
Sports Medicine Center was sold to a third party.

That provision

provides in pertinent part:
It is agreed that if within two (2) years
from the date of this Agreement, [defendant
Salt Lake Knee and Sports Medicine Center]
sells the [Salt Lake Sports Medicine] Center
to any third party, [plaintiff, Salt Lake
Knee and Sports Rehabilitation, Inc.] shall
be entitled to one-third (1/3) of that
portion of the purchase price which is
attributable to good will.
Paragraph 11 then defines the term "sale" as it is used in that
paragraph.

It specifies that a "sale" does not occur unless the

name "Salt Lake Sports Medicine Center" is sold to the third party.
"Sale" shall be defined as a transfer wherein
the purchaser acquires and pays consideration
for all of the following: . . . ownership of
the name "Salt Lake Sports Medicine Center,"
....[emphasis added]
The fact that ownership of the name "Salt Lake Sports
Medicine Center" was never sold to IHC or the joint venture,
Sports Medicine West, is undisputed.

Plaintiff, through one of

its partners and principals, Douglas Toole, admitted in his
deposition that he doesnft know whether the name Salt Lake City
Sports Medicine Center was sold to IHC or Sports Medicine West.
Toole Deposition at 85, attached as Exhibit "D11.

II
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Mr. Toole's

business associate, and the President of Plaintiff, Salt Lake Knee
and Sports Rehabilitation, Inc., Gregory Gardner, concedes the
same fact. He testified in his deposition that Plaintiff is not
entitled to any recovery unless the name "Salt Lake Sports
JMedicine Center" is sold to a third party. He then admitted that
he is not aware of any document or writing indicating the name
"Salt Lake

Sports Medicine

Center" was

sold.

G.

Gardner

Deposition at 41, attached as Exhibit "C."
Q.

And in order for this paragraph 11 [of
the Termination Agreement] to
be
triggered, it is true, is it not, that
your understanding that the name Salt
Lake Sports Medicine Center had to be
sold the third party and used by the
third party after the sale?

A.

That's correct.

Q.

Now, can you point to any document or
writing in which you are aware that the
name Salt Lake Sports Medicine Center
was sold by Salt Lake Sports Medicine
Center to IHC as part of the transaction
that followed in May of 1990?

A.

No, I couldn't tell you that.

G. Gardner Deposition at 41.
Consequently, Plaintiff had no factual basis to dispute the issue
of whether the name "Salt Lake Sports Medicine" was sold.
In striking contrast, the testimony of Dr. Lonnie Paulos, a
principal in Salt Lake Knee and Sports Medicine and a partner in
Salt Lake Sports Medicine Center, eliminates all doubt on the
issue.

He testifies that the Defendant, Salt Lake City Knee and

Sports Medicine, never sold the name "Salt Lake Sports Medicine
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Center" or otherwise conveyed that name to IHC, Sports Medicine
West, or any other third party:
11.

Neither the name "Salt Lake Sports
Medicine Center" nor any interest
therein was sold or otherwise conveyed
to IHC or any third party.

Affidavit of Dr. Paulos at 511.
These facts are uncontested and discovery is now closed. By
the express terms of the contract, plaintiff's entitlement to onethird

(1/3) of that portion of the purchase price which is

attributable to good will arises only if the sale of the name
"Salt Lake Sports Medicine Center" occurred.
Inot

occur,

plaintiffs

have

no

right

Because that sale did
to

any

recovery.

Consequently, the Court can and should determine as a matter of
law that the provisions of paragraph 11 relied on by Plaintiff are
not triggered.

For that reason, summary judgment is mandated as

a matter of law.
III.
NO PORTION OF THE PURCHASE PRICE IS
ATTRIBUTED TO GOODWILL.
A second basis for summary judgment exists that was not
previously raised or addressed by the Court of Appeals. Under the
controlling language of paragraph 11 of the Termination Agreement,
Plaintiff is entitled to a recovery only if some portion of the
purchase price paid for the Salt Lake Sports Medicine Center
assets is attributed to goodwill.

Discovery is concluded and the

record is now clear, and without dispute, that no portion of the
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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purchase price for the Salt Lake Sports Medicine Center assets was
attributed to good will.
The deposition testimony of Greg Gardner and Douglas Toole,
the principals of plaintiff, demonstrates unequivocally that they
have no personal knowledge or information that any portion of the
purchase price paid by IHC to acquire assets of the Salt Lake
Sports Medicine Center were attributed to good will.

Toole

Deposition at 88. Mr. Toole testified he doesn't know, and has no
idea what portion of the purchase price was attributable to
goodwill.
Because the principal of the Plaintiff, has admitted he has
no knowledge or information concerning whether any goodwill was
allocated to the sale of assets of Salt Lake Sports Medicine
Center, the testimony of Dr. Lonnie Paulos, the principal of the
entity selling the assets, stands uncontroverted and undisputed.
iDr. Paulos testifies and confirms that no portion of the purchase
price received from IHC was attributed to goodwill.
12. IHC did not identify or value any goodwill
associated with any assets in which it
acquired an interest from Salt Lake Sports
Medicine Center, nor did it allocate any
portion of the $662,225.00 purchase price to
goodwill associated therewith.
13. As part of the Asset Purchase Agreement
with IHC, Dr. Rosenberg and I were required to
sign a non-competition agreement pursuant to
which we agreed that we would not compete with
IHC or with the medical practices being
purchased by IHC from us.
14. I was principally involved in negotiating
the Asset Purchase Agreement with IHC. It was
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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my intent and understanding in negotiating and
executing that agreement that any multiples
paid by IHC to acquire an interest in
practices that Dr. Rosenberg and I maintained
at the aforesaid clinics, and any related
assets, was in consideration for the patients
and practices that Dr. Rosenberg and I
maintained at the Eighth Avenue Clinic and the
Park City Clinic and for the execution by us
of the aforesaid non-competition agreement.
15. No part of the purchase price paid by IHC
to acquire an undivided one-half interest in
the practices and clinics maintained and
operated by Dr. Rosenberg and me were
allocated to any goodwill involving the Salt
Lake Sports Medicine Center.
Affidavit of Dr. Paulos at 5512-15.
It is undisputed: No portion of the purchase price was
attributed to good will. Consequently, Plaintiff is not entitled
to any recovery.

It is that simple. Because there is no genuine

dispute on any material issue of fact with respect to this issue,
summary judgment can and should be entered as a matter of law.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth herein, defendants respectfully
jmove the Court for its Order granting summary judgment dismissing
the above-captioned matter as a matter of law.
DATED this • ^ p a a y of December, 1997.
CAMPBELL MAACK & SESSIONS

ROBERT S. CAMPBELL . ^ ^ g ^ ^ — L - ^
KEVIN EGAN ANDERSON
Attorneys for Defendants
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I am a member of and/or employed by the
law firm of Campbell Maack & Sessions, One Utah Center, Thirteenth
Floor, 201 South Main Street, Salt Lake City, Utah, 84111, and
that in said capacity and pursuant to Rule 5(b), Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, a true and

correct copy of the foregoing

DEFENDANTS7 MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF
THEIR MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT was served upon:
John C. Green, Esq.
Kim M. Luhn, Esq.
GREEN & LUHN, P.C.
722 Boston Building
9 Exchange Place
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
by U. S. Mail, postage prepaid.
DATED this^g<

day of December, 1997.
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JOHN C. GREEN 1242
KIM M. LUHN 5105
GREEN & LUHN, P.C.
722 Boston Building
9 Exchange Place
Salt Lake"city, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 531-7444
Attorney for Plaintiff
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
SALT LAKE COUNTY. STATE OF
SALT LAKE KNEE & SPORTS
REHABILITATION, INC., fka
PROFESSIONAL THERAPY. INC.
Plaintiff,

SALT LAKE CITY KNEE & SPORTS
MEDICINE, a Utah general
partnership. LONNIE E. PAULOS.
M.D.. P . C . a Utah professional
corporation and THOMAS D.
ROSENBERG, M.D., P.C. a Utah
professional corporation,
general partners,

•i. 'RT
K
I.T

AUTHOR
TO U\L:::.
Sl'MM. . •

"M OF POINTS AND
:; OPPOSITION
T:7 MOTION FOR
VJMENT

Case No. '•;•

b316CN

Judee Hon^r

. Wilkinson

MEMOR. •:::

Defendants.
The Plaintiff, by and through its attorney, respectful!} submits this Memorandum of
Points and Authorities in Opposition to Defendants" Motion : r iirnrnary Judgment.
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STATEMENT Oi' UNI JISPI I IIiI) I1 At" I S
Ihi parties aiiicc I liiii! illu IILiinliiri" «< ii| hi In

IIVDH1!

111 till1 .ii lion is governed by

pa r ae r anh 11 of the Termination Agreement and Purchase Agreement between the parties dated
May 22, 1989, which states:
,i ,-N a y u mai
i il: i o (2) years from the
dau
-' Physicians seiib .... Center to any third •
pan\.
all be entitled to one-third (1/3) of that
portion of the purchase price which i> attributed to good will.
"Sale" -.hull be defined as a transier wherein the purchaser acquires
--- J nays consideration lor all of the following: The Center's lease
on itie Leased Premises, ownership of the name "Salt Lake Sports
Medicine Center", all of the equipment and other assets located at
the Center, the Center's patients and accounts receivable, and
whereby the purchaser assumes complete operational control of the
business of the Center and continues operating under the same
name at the same location,
• . u;-nv UJ mi i. . laiiuu/\gicciin.iit and Purchase Agreement is herwio atu^hej. i -A1
and b> referen* >• : » n."ri he-vf It will be referred to hereafter as the "Termniativn
\ereement".)
However, after the decisions rendered by the Court, of Appeals in this matter, only two _
issues contained ii i paragrapi.

**

continue operating under the name "Salt Lake Sports Medicine Center" after its puivha^e J : die
Center in May of 1990; 'and 2) if so, what portion of the purchase price paid by the joint venture
is attnt t/iur.iv !. ...

f

wiv::.,K o: : •

. . . . . .

av

• *•

Medicine West, used the name "Salt Lake Sports Medicine Center" after the sale and if a portion
of the purchase price paid was attributable to the purchase o - • todwill, the Plaintiff is entitled to
2
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judgment for one-third of that portion of the pi irehase price au:v : :;a^!e :o eood\\ ill ( A. copy of
tlii : 1 1; iii itiff s ? lei i 101 ai idi u: 11 ii 1 Si ippoi t c if its •" •! : ti :/ -i 1 l o i I } i a-. • :.; .• ;• - ;;vie: i. ; attached hereto a s
cxliibit "2" for reference to a more specific analysis of the issue:' .'emamme after the decisions by
ihe O pi af Appeals X; A. a corollary issue, if Plaintiff prewviis. ?:ai::ii:Yis entitled to its costs
<*"'

. .-

I . UH.U

.

'

*t.

STAlTMEN'l u\ U1SPU I EDI \ a
seekinc Summan

T

Jemcm the Defendants

•ent that, no where in

the purchase and sale doiamcm
.uer.M Because ^

the name, 'ball Lake Snori:-

a\'e been sold T^

ed anions 'iie »sseis. Delcnaam- conclude thai ii cuuk;
:

vein with this issue is barred b\ the decision rendered h\ h

W U l S . Willi

e continued to operate

wncliici LUC

barred Defendants*

i^ .,amc name at the same local;";, i >we\e:
anaK'sis is overly simplistic and contrary to other in disputed facts.
Ill PI iiniiff .iilniil ill M ill-

mi do.,k, nut ipp • ir a. m ">>ei ^n any list generated

pursuant to the transaction resulting in uie ownership "i me • m.: " * die joint venture
t low

e\'ei it is likewise undisputed that IIK n-im venture continued : \<\\vi the name Sail Lake
i:^:css of briefina the first

<ei o\ motions for summary judgi nent back ii i 1993. the I X

n

, , , v . T ...

:d the affidu\ i- of Gene
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Oaks dated August A'K l'^.> wherein Mr. Oaks, as vac I icienuam- f u l n e s s manager at all times
niTiin Mit tn flip I prinnni'iiKiii Wrcr mrnt thr "ilr tn fliiir inint 'vntun ,iinl tIK lilni|.' nt Ihr I inr
i-ur:, stated. u [The ju::ii \ enture] changed the name on the door of the Center, the marquis in the
lobby and two monument signs located on the building exterior at 39 th South and at 7 th East
approsiiiiJlelv one u m belon/ lln PILiintilfs !|> n;| lilnl lllnni Lm'iiil mil <l h/lubei, "I1'11'1!1 "
Therefore, by Defendants' own account, the joint venture continued to use the name through
October of 1990, approximately four months after the sale to the joint venture in Mav
nl ilu; i laks allitlax u is adadit'd licicio as exlnhi
j

I anil is,

(A c^p v

eierence made a p a r t hereof.)

Whether or not the use of the name continued after this initial four month period is

disputed. Submitted contemporaneously with this memorandum are the affidavit of Lloyd
Mayer, a licensed pny;
relationship

'

,u

i^rup:^; A:K. >,.*:;._ i;\ itlri Di s

-'\iinuffwasterminavd. and the affidavit

^ ai.v. . .ojiiv.Tg J ; ; . ; ; I ^ . :
fJamieB.v"

ar. /

technician at the 3900 So. Center at the same time. As both tcsnh ihe signs were not chaneed at
least one year prior to this lawsuit. I lie signs were changed as a. result ot this ia\v>u =. , here lore,

Center" for approximately one and one-half years after the transfer to the joint venture (Copies
oi ine ailidavits are attached hereto as exhibits "4" a nd ' '5 1" and are, b> reference made a part
hei eof.)

4
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, >e:ene.aut> aiso argue that as a matter of law no :-.>:-:ion of the purchase price
1

"i^*.iti":-ia\ u of Defendant
.iue v»i the

;.I:ILI!''I^

oiir:^ Aa :os ;h.a ;he difference

•'

vi

- n

l - '
\

L-:-\e • ie yu\ chase pri,.e and the

assets was solely consideration ft );r non v-mpetitii >n agreements which

il H : ai i il Di R osenberg > vere allege> l b " reqi lit cd to sign

I c > h a :i \ AT:: i ±\- • i. •; the fii st til i 1 * the

Defendants have made this argument despite the fact that this lawsnii has been pending for over
•;x' * cn*s While t u e non-compet : + : ^n c l a u s e are referred v : - *^

-• '' —*;:re Agreement,

v.,;is--iic*ii v)i die Center ib csiaoiisnej. in auuiu^n. me puicnu. ^ .<. «_

..... .Tiweeu i l i L anu

Defendants all expressly list "goodwill" a- ai. . - e ! a iv ir::nsfc,*:v...

" Aiie ihcre ma.}" be a

• li: ;>|; i Hi : as to the p : i tioi 1 of the pi n c

; n itai •:• : '•: ^ao; iv ill tl lei e can be no

dispute that at least some consideration was paid for it. (Copies .A :ae Asset Purchase
Agreement the Warranty Bill of Sale and the loint Venture \greemcni are hereto attached as
e\ I

..;
5.

: e; erence made a part hereo f,}

fo establish the amount of the purchase price allocable io ihe purchase of goodwill at

nia!, the Plaintiff will call Kirk W. Bennett, a certified public accounuint and an attorney.
! vpeeit ically it is Mr. Bennett. s opinion that, where a sale has acn iaii; taken place ai id a
i purchaser has paid a sum certain, the best evidence of value ::. Ac ;v,:;v:hase price

Any

theoretical valuation is no longer necessary as a theoretical vair.ai..-n is done for the purpose of
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determining what a hypothetical purchaser would, pay for the item purchased. Therefore, Mr

subpoenaed from IHC and documents produced by the Defendants. Primarily, in addition to the
contracts between Defendants and IHC and the Joint Venture Agreement, he reviewed a
iliiuiiin nl i i ill I bill "I ili nl ml in in ul \h li.illb I'un Ini .1 ML11, III"'' I "HI"" mil ,i mullipdyt |wtkt1 n. Inn II
begins with a memo to Everett Goodwin from D.R. Gardner dated October 5, 1990. Attached to
the latter are accounting documents generated by IHC with respect to the transaction with
I VfciiiLtnii ilopn. i ml tfii'i.t/

IIUUUIIILT.

.

:

... > ;-oena and response documents are

attached hereto as exhibit "9" and are, by reference made a part hereof.)
Mr. Bennett has determined that the difference between the purchase price and the
:. -aiiij 01 me idii^iciL a;->bct.. .>, :;*c value of the purchase price atti, ..table to goodwill.
Specif].:,.

*\:-\±L:

>. —ice paid by IHC f< >r < )

' nlf o f the Center, $ 4 8 7 000 is the

difference between the book, value of the tangible assets and :he purchase price. This number is
then doubled because the entire 1. writer was transferred to the joint venture. I herefbre, the value
• * ' ;- -lM"' > •

lassified a s "general intangibles" on its books and records is $974 ,000.

; s:;> 1;umber must be allocated between the 3900 So. Center and another facility on 8th Ave in
which I Maintiff has no interest, while Mr. Bennett is not able to specifically allocate without
ninnr infoinialinni In1 eslini.ilinii 111 lli.il Pl.miliff is entitled U\ fil(M K IK SO plus inlnir I l u lllin
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^ exhibit - "10"at pages

transcript of the deposition of Kirk W Ren;u ;; *\hick > an. .' .
76

; ;

' • >6 )

/. While the Defendants argue that iiothin * exnres
consideration paid as attributable to
olse
die

\ ;ran^;

'. *

"LIOIU!

.,.;

*- :v" '* -

. r^ vixes any of the

: Bern-,.;

. -;v:iion that there is nothing

... » "genera: ;nn.::c - .

\fier reaching a figure for

\

he.
^pec ;

\-

••.

-j.

e

determine :! an} ^ther asset could be included in this ciassiifeaiion. I ie looked for
i^ms ^ u ' i as patents, trademarks, copyrights, etc. Finding none, he concluded that the
ild be represented as an ii nam liblc is 'g< v i \ n; "

:• : vh :\ n lett deposition at

8. With respect to the Defendants* new allegation that the diiVerence in the purchase
I »i if :< : ai in: il ill ie I: >c : 1 : 'ah ie of the tai lgible assets is consideratii in ; -ai- i >oU :i; • foi a not i-competitioi I
agreement by Defendants, there is absolutely no indication in the hooks and records of
Defendants or IHC that this is the case, Therefore, while Defendants rely on the 'feet that the
i M n ) "; si MI !.ei al ii itangibles" dc es :i i :)!: expressb • inch id * tl i : tei n i ""; :v Hxiwil!" ill iey a:t e sti id : ' > it'll i tl ie
fact that it also does not expressly list a "non-competition agreenient"". ! urther. the Asset
Purchase Agreement between II IC and Defendants does expressi} lis; "goodwill" and does not
e
assets, expressly" including goodwill, remains a valid measure oftiie value of goodwill.

7
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0. The non-competition provisions of the Joint Venture Agreement recite -no monetary
consideration. Instead, pursuant to the terms of the Joint V enture Agreement, the consideration
may well have been the fact that II IC also agreed to correspond^ •

- ,. - •

In addition, the non-competition provisions in the Joint Ven! are \i:reernent specifically state that
they are necessary to "preserve" and "enhance" the value of the goodwill oi aic Center, This
cl 2arl> establish^

;

-

-

,d

pursuant to the Asset Purchase Agreement. The non-competition could easily have increased the
value of the investment in the joint venture, but this does not change the fact that the parties
agreed

.

s

enhancement. In addition, as Mr. Bennett pointed out in his deposition, any such noncompetition agreement would be reduced in its value because the agreement would in essence be

ACUMEN!
THE FACTS DO NOT SUPPORT THE RELIEF DEFENDANTS REQUEST, AND
GENUINE ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT PRECLUDE SUMMARY JUDGMENT
AV
THE FS! TF OF THE PORTION OF PURCHASE PRICE ATTRTRTTTART F
TO GOODWILL
Pursuant to Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, a party is entitled to summary
judgment only if the "'pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,

that the moving part) is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law."
8
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T h e Defendants cannot meet this burden on any of the issues the}* have raised T o begin
' "ill i ill :ie Defei iciai its ai 21 le tl lat the :i ia.ii i ie Salt I ake Spoi is ! It s; ii :ii n : ( \M ltei w as i lot pui el: lased
by "the joint venture. First, this issue is barred by the decision of the Court of Appeals which has
remanded solely to determine if the joint venture continued operating under the name "Salt I ake
v •:: \iedicii;c ^ ... '
evidence which supports the Defendants* argument is a self-serving affidavit filed b\ Lonnie
~ : . i " :o this effee: F \ i d c n c e u h ' c h establishes to the com-,::- ' " : .e admission by the
- h. leiiu^nt^ ..ij; :\w ;^aUv J . U . u \ , tlL ingc loi «; ica:.; lour moni:- - ".••..• i.'-ra \ e n t u r e
•* *

*

* itei ial

• • "ri:- dispute eu: - ne are aoi parties to this actio;; \\ . me:: :^::;:v. i ::,a; ;he name \va^ not
changed until this lawsuit was filed, eighteen months after the transaction. Either way it is
le i lan le 1 tad nc *ah te an: id that it 'as i it >t } u u < :hasi :c 1 1 1 le par ti ss tc this
lawsuit recognized the value when they entered into the I erminaiion .Agreement at issue in this
matter and made continued use of the n a m e an element required to trigger payout under
r
months and possibly as long as eighteen months establishes otherwise as a matter of law
The next argument made by Defendants is that, a- a m r r e r o f l a w . no portion of the
i >! in :!! iasi : price paid by 1:1 le joii it \, ei itn n e is atti ibi uablc tc • tl ic pi :: c! ::,::is: : of good ' : 'ill Instead the
disparity" between the purchase price and the book value of the tangible assets is consideration

9
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solely for the signing of a non-competition agreement h} i ^^ndaiii^ N*. liliei inc law nor the

•business presumptively includes 'the sale of goodwill. In South Utah Mortuary v. Olpin 776 P.2d
945 (I Jtah App 1989), the Court of Appeals stated:
Goodwill cannot be transferred apart from the business with which
it is connected. Consequently, the sale of a business presumptively
includes the sale of the businesses goodwill, even though it is not
specified.
(Id. at 948, citing Nims, the Lam of I Jn fail Competition and I rademarks, 4th ed 194 > §1 3
at 86 and 91.) '
In reaching this decision, the Court of Appeals relied on an earlier Utah Supreme Court case,
Valley Mortuary? v. Fairbanks 22.5 P,2d 739, 745 (1950) wherein the Utah,. Supreme Court .:. "
'[W]here a person sells a business and in connection therewith
agrees not to engage in the same business, the obvious intent is to
sell the gobdwill of the business.'
766 P.2d at 948.
Not only do the purchase documents and the bill of sale expressly list goodw ill. if they'
did not,, Ihnv is ,i !HM! presumption nl itwliis] m uinl (im iiiivit lur m mm i onipcfifioii agreement
is further evidence of an "obvious intent" to sell goodwill. Therefore, the Defendants argument
must fail as a matter of law.
. .

h Defendants rely for fh i s «i i p i i n n c 11 if, t hv c m n I y

reference to non-competition is found in the Joint Venture Agreement. The documents relating
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Robert S. Campbell
Perrin Love
Kevin Egan Anderson
CAMPBELL MAACK & SESSIONS
One Utah Center, 13th Floor
201 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
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FEB I 0 '9C:
S. CAMPBELL, JR. (0557)
KEVIN EGAN ANDERSON (0099)
CAMPBELL MAACK & SESSIONS
One Utah Center, Thirteenth Floor
:201 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
(801) 537-5555
ROBERT

Attorneys for Defendants
IN TIIK THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AMP
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
SALT LAKE KNEE & SPORTS
REHABILITATION, INC., fka
PROFESSIONAL THERAPY, INC.,
Plaintiff,

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS'
MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT

vs.
SALT LAKE CITY KNEE & SPORTS
MEDICINE, a Utah general
partnership, LONNIE E. PAULOS,
M.D., P.C., a Utah
professional corporation and
THOMAS D. ROSENBURG, M.D.,
P.C., a Utah professional
corporation/ general partners,

C i v i l No. 910906316 CN
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JOHN C. GREEN 1242
KIM M. LUHN 5105
GREEN & LUHN, P.C.
722 Boston Building
9 Exchange Place
Salt Lake^City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 531-7444
Attorney for Plaintiff
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
SALT LAKE KNEE & SPORTS
REHABILITATION, INC., fka
PROFESSIONAL THERAPY, INC.,

AFFIDAVIT OF LLOYD MAYER

Plaintiff,
v.
SALT LAKE CITY KNEE & SPORTS
MEDICINE, a Utah general
partnership. LONNIE E. PAULOS,
M.D.. P.C. a Utah professional
corporation and THOMAS D.
ROSENBERG, M.D., P . C , a Utah
professional corporation,
general partners,

Case No. 910906316CN
Judge Homer F. Wilkinson

Defendants.

STATE OF UTAH

)

:ss
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )
Lloyd Maypf being first duly sworn under oath does hereby depose and state as follows:
1. I am an adult male over the age of twenty-one years.
2. I have personal knowledge of the facts contained in this affidavit and if I were called
to testify in court I would testify accordingly.
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3.

I am a licensed physical therapist and Prior to June of 1989,1 worked for Dr. Lonnie /*&&<•

Paulos at his business address of 359 8th Avenue, Salt Lake City, Utah.
4.

I am also familiar with Douglas Toole and Greg Gardner, whose company rented a

facility from Dr. Paulos at 670 East 3900 South, Salt Lake City, Utah.
5.

When Dr. Paulos terminated his relationship with Mr. Toole and Mr. Gardner in

approximately June of 1989,1 moved to the 3900 South offices to work with physical therapy
patients for Dr. Paulos and Dr. Rosenberg.
6. When I went to work at the 3900 South facility the name "Salt Lake City Sports
Medicine" was displayed on two signs located on the outside of the building. The signs remained
unchanged until this lawsuit was filed. At that time, Dr. Paulos ordered the signs to be taken
down.
FURTHER AFFIANT SAYETH NAUGHT.
DATED this \ ^

day of January, 1998.

LLOYD
.OYD MAYER

'
/-1

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO beforeIne thlsV^ day'ofJanuary, 1998.

NOTARY PUBLIC
My Commission Expires:
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
r

L-W

I hereby certify that on the (n^day of January, 1998.1 caused to be hand delivered a true
and correct copy of the foregoing Affidavit to the following:

Robert S. Campbell
Perrin Love
Kevin Egan Anderson
CAMPBELL MAACK & SESSIONS
One Utah Center, 13th Floor
201 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
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COURTESY UUPY
i£P

MARK O. MORRIS (A4636) and
CARY D. JONES (A1733) of
SNELL & WJJLMER
111 East Broadway, Suite 900
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 237-1900
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Attorneys for Defendants
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
—ooOoo—
SALT LAKE KNEE & SPORTS
REHABILITATION INC. f/k/a
PROFESSIONAL THERAPY, INC.

AFFIDAVIT OF GENE OAKES
IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S
COUNTER-MOTION FOR PARTIAL
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Plaintiff,

Civil No. 9109063160CN
SALT LAKE CITY KNEE & SPORTS
MEDICINE, a Utah General
Partnership and LONNIE E.
PAULOS, M.D., P.C., a Utah Professional
Corporation and THOMAS D.
ROSENBERG, M.D., P.C., a Utah
Professional Corporation,
General Partners,

Judge Homer F. Wilkinson

Defendants.
—ooOoo—

SLCl-DECKARM-9954.1
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

STATE OF UTAH

)
: ss.

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

)

Gene Oakes, being over the age of 21 and being otherwise competent to testify,
hereby deposes and states that he has personal knowledge of the following facts:
1.

I am a Certified Public Accountant and am the business office manager for

The Orthopedic Specialty Clinic.
2.

I was the business office manager for Salt Lake Knee & Sports Medicine

("Salt Lake Knee"), located at 359 8th Avenue and 670 East 3900 South (the "Center"),
from August, 1987 to its closing in August of 1991.
3.

I was the business office manager of Salt Lake Knee at the time that the

Plaintiffs and Defendants in the above lawsuit entered into the Termination Agreement and
Purchase Agreement ("Termination Agreement") which terminated the Professional Services
Contract and Lease Agreement which previously existed between the Plaintiff and Defendants
in this case. I had an office at the 8th Avenue Center with Plaintiff and Defendants when
they were located in the same building, and have had an office in the same building with
Defendants since May, 1989.
4.

I was the business office manager for the Defendants at the time they entered

into an agreement with IHC Hospitals, Inc. ("IHC Agreement").
5.

After the Defendants and IHC Hospitals, Inc. entered into the IHC Agreement,

those parties changed the name on the door of the Center, the marquis in the lobby and two

SLCl - DECKARM - 9954 i
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monument signs located on the building exterior at 39th South and at 7th East approximately
one year before the Plaintiffs filed their lawsuit in October, 1991.
Further Affiant sayeth naught.
DATED this JO_ day of August, 1993.

GENEOAKES
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this3
jfcHayof August, 1993.

«CVCX?

i
,• > ^ V 2 4 0 5 S c u l h

••v yanrnzzm

•

Expires 3

TARY PUBLIC
Residing in^alt Lake County, Utah

~ 3 SOO 3-W
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed a true and accurate copy of the foregoing,
postage prepaid, on this t h e ' 7 _ x i a y of September, 1993, to:
John C. Green
Kim Luhn, Esq.
Liapis, Gray, Stegall & Green
Third Floor, New York Building
48 Exchange Place
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101

"-YYW^ vl\,.4r^i
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JOHN C. GREEN 1242
KIM M. LUHN 5105
GREEN & LUHN, P.C.
722 Boston Building
9 Exchange Place
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 531-7444
Attorney for Plaintiff
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
SALT LAKE KNEE & SPORTS
REHABILITATION, INC., fka
PROFESSIONAL THERAPY, INC.,

AFFIDAVIT OF JAMBE BEERS

Plaintiff,

SALT LAKE CITY KNEE & SPORTS
MEDICINE, a Utah general
partnership, LONNIE E. PAULOS,
M.D., P.C, a Utah professional
corporation and THOMAS D.
ROSENBERG, M.D., P . C , a Utah
professional corporation,
general partners,

Case No. 910906316CN
Judge Homer F. Wilkinson

Defendants.

STATE OF UTAH
:ss
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )
Jamie Beers being first duly sworn under oath does hereby depose and state as follows:
1. I am an adult male over the age of twenty-one years.
2. I have personal knowledge of the facts contained in this affidavit and if I were called
to testify in court I would
testify accordingly.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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3. During and after 1989,1 worked for Drs Lonnie Pauh> .::u Thomas D. Rosenberg as
an ex-ray technician at their offices located at 670 East 3900 -••:::;. Sail Lake City, Utah.
4. I am familiar with Doug Toole and Greg Gardner. *li<.? ; -au ;i physical therapy business
located at the 3900 South address and worked with patients of D«v. ?au!os and Rosenberg.
5. I am aware that in approximately June of 1989. Mr. Tooie and Mr. Gardner's business
moved from the 3900 South address.
6.

Prior to and at the time of the move, there were signs on the exterior as well as the

interior of the building advertising that the business being conchijrid was "Salt Lake Sports
Medicine". The signs remained unchanged until this lawsuit was ;iioj. At that time, Drs Paulos
and Rosenberg caused the signs to be changed.
FURTHER AFFIANT SAYETH NAUGHT.
DATED this /-? day of January, 1998.

fa M^C-cC

J>AMIE BEERS
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this I I day -f" January. 1998.
:L~

NOTARY PUBLIC
My Commission Expires:
--bite

^

:.u:&vj Exchange Pi. I
.:ao:,v.,Jah8^111 j
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

il

I hereby certify that on the J l L l day of January, 1998,1 caused to be hand delivered a true
and correct copy of the foregoing Affidavit to the following:

Robert S. Campbell
Perrin Love
Kevin Egan Anderson
CAMPBELL MAACK & SESSIONS
One Utah Center, 13th Floor
201 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
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